Council On Foreign Relations

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Roundtable on Country Risk in the Post-Asia Crisis Era:
Identifying Risks, Strategies, and Policy Implications

Key Recommendations from Working Group Discussions 10/99-9/00

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the three years since the July 2, 1997 devaluation of the Thai baht, countless analyses have addressed the causes of and remedies for the Asian financial crisis, and many efforts have focused on reducing the risks for both investors and countries. Under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, leading members of the investor and policy-making communities have conducted two annual series of Country Risk Roundtable discussions, focusing on the country analysis and sovereign debt restructuring processes. The purpose of the discussions has been to identify ways to improve the identification and management of risks related to countries in the global financial system. Country risk analysis and the debt restructuring process are critical to the stability and viability of the global financial system, as evidenced by the key questions posed by Roundtable participants:

• Why did virtually no analyst in either the investor or policy communities foresee the depth or duration of the Asian crisis and its far-reaching consequences for the Asian countries, other emerging markets, and the industrialized nations? What can be done to improve our ability to assess vulnerabilities, risks, and channels of contagion, enabling investors and policy-makers alike to minimize the economic, political, and social costs of future financial crises?
• As the global financial system expands to include new countries, investors, and types of instruments, what are the basic principles and rules of conduct for key players, investors, governments, and international financial institutions, such as the IMF? What are the residual systemic risks posed by the recent debt restructurings, and how can we reduce these risks with new processes and mechanisms?

The recommendations set forth below are intended to provide a summary of the most important observations and suggestions made by individuals participating in the Roundtable discussions, and do not imply the endorsement of participating organizations or the Council. Participants and observers included leading country risk practitioners (from rating agencies and other country risk services, commercial banks, and the investor community), as well as government officials and analysts (from the International Financial Institutions, the U.S. and other creditor governments, and borrowing country governments). Since the purpose of the Roundtable discussions has been to provide a forum for a wide-ranging exploration of issues and solutions, no effort was made to reach consensus on the wording of specific recommendations.

Key findings and recommendations, detailed in the report, are summarized below:

1. An historic opportunity confronts us: the utilization of the manifold increases in global capital for the benefit of investors, countries, and their citizens worldwide. As noted by studies done by the World Bank and others, the rise in new sources of capital coupled with the demand for services and products has created the potential for unprecedented growth across the world’s economies, enhancing overall global standards of living.
2. However, as well evidenced by recent financial crises, the increased complexity of the global financial system has also resulted in new risks of unknown magnitude and origin. To meet the shared objective of investors and policy-makers in fully employing capital worldwide for the benefit of all, major improvements are needed that serve to further strengthen the global financial system. While important initiatives have been advanced in many areas, further progress is required to avoid major disruptions resulting in unacceptable economic, political, and social costs, that risk undermining the economic progress made to date.
3. Specific recommended action steps put forward by the Roundtable’s working groups that are seen as critical to strengthening the global financial system include:
• Formulate “Principles” for Sovereign Bond Restructurings: Bonds have replaced loans as a major source of capital for many countries, resulting in an exponential increase in the number and types of investors. However, the recent turmoil in international markets, coupled with a series of sovereign bond restructurings, has caused many of these investors to reduce or eliminate their emerging market bond exposures. In order to renew the confidence of these investors and reduce the risk of systemic retrenchment of capital from these markets, there needs to be a clearer delineation of principles outlining the sovereign debt restructuring process. Included in this report is a proposed list of principles put together by creditors involved in recent sovereign restructurings, in consultation with officials from the IMF, BIS, and major creditor and debtor governments.
• Further Definition of Accountabilities for Key Parties in the Global Financial System: We are in the midst of a major debate on how to stabilize the global financial system, with much of the criticism vented at the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), most notably the IMF. However, other parties also bear key responsibility, member governments, their regulatory structures, and investors themselves. And, very importantly, there are severe constraints on what the IFIs can realistically deliver in terms of independent, timely analysis, given their membership and governance structure. Yet, the availability of independent, timely analysis is critical to the stability and integrity of the global financial system. Included in our Roundtable Report are recommendations on how to set up more realistic accountabilities for the major parties of the global financial system, with a new check-and balance function for third party auditors, as a means to strengthen the independence and timeliness of analysis guiding policy makers and investors.
• Expand the Current Approach to Improving Data and Transparency: The extensive measures undertaken by the IMF and others in the area of improving data and transparency are clearly important, but have proved insufficient to date for meeting the needs of the wider investment community for quality and timely comprehensive analysis. If we are to expect investors to identify risks, then the official sector comprised of government and IFI representatives must assure them that they have the full set of data and information required for that task. The remaining problems are three: First, the traditional data and information sets are still lacking consistency of definition and timeliness, and may be inaccurate. Second, globalization and heightened economic interdependencies has created new linkages and vulnerabilities that require entirely new data sets. Third, data and information that is available needs to be provided in formats and through mechanisms that are more usable for the wide universe of users, through the Internet and other fora that allow for wider dissemination. All these efforts will require the formation of sustained working groups of analysts and users, drawn from investors, analysts, and policymakers, with a mandate to think and research openly about solving these problems. Included in this Report are examples of current problems and recommendations.
• Further Revamping of Risk Management Models and Regulatory Approaches with More Robust Qualitative Methods: All parties agree that the Asian crisis has underlined the limitations of commonly used analytic approaches, in particular fixed-income sovereign ratings and Value-At-Risk models, as accurate indicators of financial vulnerability and the potential for crisis. While recent surveys indicate refinement of these approaches, risk management models in place across the financial sector, including those envisaged in BIS and other regulatory processes continue to rely principally on these same mechanisms. Recommendations from the Institute of International Finance (IIF) and others have underlined the importance of overlaying qualitative analytic methods, such as scenarios and stress testing, and their systematic integration into these quantitative approaches and risk judgements. The main obstacles to effectively implementing these recommendations are twofold: 1) need to develop simple ways to integrate these more qualitative models into current decision making structures, interface with rating systems, and regulatory frameworks; and 2) lack of independent, quality research that meets this criteria, and that is easily accessible and affordable for the wider investor community. Included in this report are specific suggestions on methods and means to address these shortcomings.
• Modify Current Performance Measures, Regulatory Regimes, and Analytic Input to Facilitate Use of Quality Data and Analysis in Investor Decision Making: With the recent financial crises, the notion that “markets” reward performance has been discredited in the eyes of many. Many analyses of the Asian crisis have acknowledged that inadvertently both regulatory and market factors skewed capital flows, accentuating systemic risk and market herding. Despite this recognition, however, little research has been conducted that systemically identifies how current regulatory and market performance benchmarks may serve to unintentionally distort investor decision making, and what changes would realign fundamental analysis as the basis for decision making, so that performance is rewarded with the availability of affordable capital. This report includes suggestions on research imperatives.

II. RECOMMENDATION ONE: Formulate “Principles” for Sovereign Bond Restructurings

Bonds have replaced loans as a major source of capital for many countries, resulting in an exponential increase in the number and types of investors. However, the recent turmoil in international markets, coupled with a series of sovereign bond restructurings, has caused many of these investors to reduce or eliminate their emerging market bond exposures. In order to renew the confidence of these investors and reduce the systemic retrenchment of capital from these markets, there needs to be a clearer delineation of principles outlining the sovereign restructuring process. Included in this report is a proposed list of principles put together by creditors involved in recent sovereign restructurings, in consultation with officials from the IMF, BIS, and major creditor and debtor governments.

The following Principles are designed to be "best practices" for the conduct of private creditors and the Sovereign in connection with a Sovereign debt restructuring. It is recognized that the effectiveness of these Principles will depend on the support of the official community, particularly the IMF. The support of the IMF will be needed in providing private creditors with the IMF’s analysis and views regarding the financial difficulties and economic prospects of the sovereign, including the sustainable debt capacity. Moreover, whether the IMF decides to extend financing to a sovereign in default will depend on whether the sovereign is negotiating in good faith with its private creditors. Accordingly, to the extent that the major private creditors of a sovereign choose to act upon the principles set forth below, the sovereign’s willingness to negotiate within the framework established by these principles will be of relevance to the IMF when it makes its judgement to provide financing.

1. Organization of Creditors. When a Sovereign encounters financial difficulties triggering or likely to trigger a debt default, it should encourage a process of dialogue among affected creditors and the Sovereign. Major private creditors may choose to initiate the formation of an ad hoc Steering Committee to be representative of all major, relevant private creditor groups. Within this Steering Committee, significant creditor groups, such as bondholders, may elect to form a subcommittee from within their group as the vehicle for participating in the Steering Committee. Where one or more subcommittees have been formed, all references in these Principles to the Steering Committee should be deemed also to constitute references to any subcommittees. Thus, a Principle urging the provision of financial information to the Steering Committee should be construed as also urging contemporaneous provision of the same information to each subcommittee.
2. Cooperation of the Sovereign. The Sovereign should cooperate with the Steering Committee. Such cooperation should include: (i)†providing to the Steering Committee information and analysis regarding the current financial situation of the Sovereign and its economic prospects, (ii)†holding discussions with the Steering Committee with regard to a financial solution, including the mechanism to be used to accomplish the solution, and (iii)†providing information to the Steering Committee regarding any proposed additional debt.
3. Retention of Professional Advisers. The Steering Committee (including each subcommittee) may retain legal advisers and financial advisers to assist in the discussions and in the development of financial and economic analyses. Where feasible, financial advisers should be jointly retained by the Steering Committee and each subcommittee in order to develop consistent analyses. The Sovereign should pay the reasonable fees and expenses of these professionals, and should reimburse members of the Steering Committee for their out-of-pocket expenses.
4. Coordination with the Paris Club. The Paris Club and the Steering Committee should consult, including sharing of financial and economic analyses with regard to the Sovereign and discussing respective creditor contributions to a solution to the Sovereign’s difficulties.
5. Sharing of Information. The information described in Principle 2(i) should in most circumstances be provided to the entire investment community whether or not a Steering Committee has yet been formed. If it is necessary to protect confidential Sovereign information or market-sensitive information, the Sovereign should not be required to share such information except with Steering Committee and subcommittee members, and/or their professional advisers, who enter into appropriate confidentiality agreements.
6. Participants in a Restructuring. Unless otherwise agreed, all relevant private and Paris Club debt should be included in any restructuring in a manner that fairly represents each such creditor group’s position with respect to the Sovereign. As to omitted creditor groups, normally the Sovereign bears the burden of persuading the Steering Committee that such groups are not relevant to any restructuring.
7. Voluntary Stay of Legal Action. Creditors should refrain from taking legal action or advancing any pending lawsuits provided the Sovereign is engaging in conduct, including good faith negotiations, in accordance with these Principles.
8. Changes in Bond Documentation. Consideration should be given to changing bond documentation, to the extent possible, to assist in the implementation of these Principles, including insertion of collective action clauses (requiring super-majorities, i.e., 90% of bondholder, excluding bonds owed directly or indirectly by the Sovereign) and provision for the appointment of Trustees to assist in the early formation of committees, preferably prior to a default.

III. RECOMMENDATION TWO: Further Define and Activate Accountabilities for Key Parties in the Global Financial System

We are in the midst of a major debate on how to stabilize the global financial system, with much of the criticism vented at the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), most notably the IMF. However, other parties also bear key responsibility - member governments, their regulatory structures, and investors themselves. And, very importantly, there are severe constraints on what the IFIs can realistically deliver in terms of independent, timely analysis, given their membership and governance structure. Yet the availability of independent, timely analysis is critical to the stability and integrity of the global financial system.

Below are recommendations on how to define and activate accountabilities for the major parties of the global financial system. Specific steps and incentives are identified, with the objective of identifying the means for building upon the successes to-date in setting standards and improving data disclosure. Most of the suggested mechanisms are based on best practices in corporate finance, such as the establishment of a check-and balance function with third party auditors as a means to strengthen the integrity of data disclosures, and depoliticize the current process for standard setting and data disclosure. Also, just as the accounting profession sets accounting rules, the country risk profession should be an integral actor in the definition of data needs and an intrinsic part of the data audit process.

A) DEBTOR GOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITY: Debtor governments (not the IMF) bear direct, primary responsibility for providing timely, accurate, and comprehensive disclosures on national accounts, the balance of payments, and material policy changes potentially affecting the economy and business environment of individual countries.

Just as with individual companies, the building blocks for financial stability must begin with a strong foundation in the integrity and credibility of each individual country and the integrity of its reporting. The primary objective of comprehensive, real time disclosure programs, built on a more explicit country accountability basis, is to develop a functional and solid system that facilitates transparent, candid and timely communication between government policy makers, investors, and analysts. This will serve to establish and maintain market confidence, thereby stabilizing market conditions, enabling coordinated and effective policy responses, and reducing the probability of investor panic, massive capital reversals, and costly financial crisis.

The current system of data disclosure has inadvertently created systemic vulnerabilities that undermine the objective of strengthening country accountability and investor access. A new initiative in data disclosure -- that is perceived as building the basis for an independent and credible global system of debtor government disclosure -- is sorely needed on an urgent basis, and critical to the stability of the global financial system. The reasons are three-fold:

• The current disclosure system lacks credibility: Recent allegations against several governments for the manipulation of data provided to the IMF and investors have significantly hurt the overall credibility of governments, the IMF, and the global financial system itself, contributing to a reduction in the availability of capital flows to developing countries, as well as the number of overall market participants.
• Countries are lagging in compliance to the numerous standards set by the IMF and other standard-setting institutions: Twelve key standards have been set. (See the Financial Stability Forum’s web site: www.fsforum.org.) The IMF has enhanced the Data Dissemination Disclosure System (DSSD) with further initiatives, such as the enhanced ROSC reporting system. Yet investors still report gross data deficiencies, especially for countries undergoing financial stress and restructuring, such as Ecuador and Russia. Fatigue has set in across countries themselves, with uneven country adherence to the standards being developed by the IMF and others. Many country policy makers, strained by the cost and complexity of adhering to these standards, note that many investors do not use the data already provided. More direct incentives and mechanisms are needed for countries to comply meaningfully with investor disclosure requirements, and conversely for investors to use these disclosures (as noted below).
• The composition of current investors and debtors requires higher levels of disclosure and ease of analysis: As the global financial system has expanded to include an exponential increase in the number and type of private sector participants, a large majority do not have the capacity to verify government data and information, and are adverse to investing in markets perceived as lacking adequate levels of data disclosure. Investors also need more “user-friendly” data and information, that is easier to access, analyze, and interface with their internal decision making processes.

The current system lacks a structure for reinforcing country accountability and does not facilitate direct, cost-effective communication between governments and investors. While the principle of “transparency” and disclosure is widely supported today, the actual system itself places the onus on the IMF to define and implement disclosure programs. Despite its critical role on many fronts, the IMF cannot, by virtue of its shareholders and innately political decision-making process, play a completely neutral expert role in identifying and disclosing risks on a timely basis to the larger public. Examples abound on how countries have become entangled in the innately political decision making process within the IMF. Furthermore, it is not constructive for the IMF, given its critical role in stabilizing the global financial system, to become tarnished as the “scapegoat” for country failures or mistakes.

The recommended approach noted here differs markedly in that it suggests that more direct accountability of each government for its data disclosure is fundamental to establishing and maintaining both data integrity and market confidence. The foundations of the global financial system would be strengthened on two pivotal fronts:

• Independent country disclosure programs would serve to facilitate more direct, candid interactive communication between government policy makers and their investors and analysts, serving to enhance the analysis of both country conditions and market sentiment, as well as reduce the risk of costly misunderstandings and market panic.
• The IMF’s capacity for preemptive surveillance would be enhanced, given the larger, more meaningful participation of investors and analysts in reviewing and querying country disclosures.

Suggested next action steps for debtor governments, that will build on progress made to-date, include the following:

1)As a confidence building measure, debtor governments of both industrial and developing countries should provide more explicit and concrete evidence of their commitment to adhere with the above principles of full and open disclosure, by means of signing a public statement to that effect, with a detailed program fully disclosing how their respective country program will be effectively implemented. The statement should include an explicit commitment to:

• Disclose all relevant data and information, expanding the current disclosure items in response to information and data needs expressed by their specific investor base (even in times of economic, political, and social uncertainty and stress);
• Establish open forums for the discussions of country issues (building on the investor conferences and communiqués held by countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina); and
• Provide across the board coordination with both the IFIs and the investor community in increasing “transparency” and adherence to global standards.

2) Each debtor government should establish a detailed operation for the “Disclosure Programs” in conjunction with support and guidelines provided by the IFIs and the investor community at large. Critical aspects of the “Disclosure Programs” include the following:

• Each country should provide a detailed written explanation of its “Disclosure Program,” that specifically details the country’s disclosure commitments in terms of data and information fields, definitions, frequency, sources, distribution channels, and information contacts for specific categories of questions. Such disclosures should go beyond that of data commonly provided on today’s web sites, to include policy changes, and all factors potentially having a material effect on the economy and the business environment.
• Just as the accounting profession is intrinsic to the definition of company reporting requirements, so should the country analytical community from both the investor and policymaking communities be employed in helping to define reporting requirements and issues. The country should be responsive to suggestions received from market participants and IFIs on needed changes in its “Disclosure Program," in terms of changes to data definitions, other information requirements, frequency of reporting, formats, etc.
• All disclosures, including data and qualitative information, should be posted immediately on country web sites, and provided on an open basis to all classes of investors, rating agencies, and International Financing Institutions (IFIs). It is especially important to keep these disclosures updated on a real time basis during times which the country is undergoing actual or perceived difficulties (financial, economic, political, or social).
• Such “Disclosure Programs” should be explicitly structured to have the capacity to respond in a timely and comprehensive manner to the questions of creditors and their industry forums.
• In order to insure the effectiveness, integrity, and priority of such “Disclosure Programs," each country’s Chief of State should appoint an executive in his or her government with the responsibility of overseeing the program, and coordinating with the IFIs, the private sector and industry organizations, and other regional and global initiatives concerned with the establishment of global disclosure standards. To set the stage, G-7 governments could provide needed leadership by announcing such “Disclosure Programs” for their own countries, with the objective of promoting stable global financial markets and global prosperity.

4) Annual third party audits of the Program should be conducted by independent parties, as with company financial statements, as a critical function in maintaining market confidence in the integrity of each country’s disclosure program. In the event a country is undergoing financial or economic stress that may potentially result in debt service difficulties, such independent audits may be conducted at more frequent intervals, as requested by any one of the involved parties (i.e., the debtor government, the creditors and investors, the IFIs).

5) While improvements have been made to most countries’ disclosure, further enhancements need to be made on an urgent basis, with input from market participants and IFIs in conjunction with the above “Disclosure Programs." Priority needs to be given in the following two areas:

• More and better information is needed, using international data definitions when available, and in user-friendly formats that facilitate time series and other analysis.
• Debtor governments need to provide more effective liaison points for investor access, facilitating the timely provision of data and analysis to response to creditor queries.

The creation of more meaningful incentives for compliance with data and information disclosure is critical to operationalizing these country disclosure programs. All parties to the credit provision process must collaborate to safeguard the principles of full and accurate disclosure, and to insure that these principles are upheld in practice at all times, thereby maintaining the credibility of the global financial system. Examples of specific incentive mechanisms that are needed as foundations to this process are provided below:

1)MARKET - ACCESS: The establishment of market-based incentives is critical to the successful implementation of the objectives set forth above. For example:

• National and international regulatory authorities can provide powerful mechanisms by informing investors of country disclosure practices and further by restricting market access to only sovereigns that have “Disclosure Programs” in place and are committed to improved disclosure requirements within defined time-frames. Furthermore, corporates from countries that have not complied with such country disclosure requirements may also be restricted from access to key markets such as the US. (Note: Basle accord proposals may link countries’ risk weights to adherence to SDDS.)
• Credit evaluation and news services such as the rating agencies, country risk services, and the financial press can issue “market warnings” whenever country disclosures are incomplete, misleading, or not timely. In particular, country rating agencies can incorporate disclosure requirements into their rating criteria, downgrading country ratings or outlooks if disclosure standards are not met.
• Creditor and investor organizations (such as the SIA, EMTA, IIF, etc.) can play important roles in communicating private sector concerns to debtor governments.

• Negotiations directly between governments, and through government associations, IFIs, etc.;
• Formal agreements between governments and through government associations, IFIs, and global standard initiatives (such as the International Accounting Standards, IOSCO, etc.);
• Explicit, highly visible support of private sector initiatives involved in setting global standards and improving transparency (such as SIA, IIF, etc.);
• Funding (bilateral and multilateral) of Country Disclosure Programs, with supporting technical assistance and conference meetings;
• Public denunciations of debtor governments failing to meet disclosure standards through bilateral, regional, and multilateral channels;
• The threat of withholding bilateral and multilateral credit when governments fail to uphold disclosure standards (formalized where appropriate in bilateral and multilateral operating principles);
• Tying compliance with disclosure standards to other programs, such as trade, aid, technical assistance, and defense agreements; and
• Enact regulatory mechanisms to restrict corporate and sovereign access to overseas markets when disclosure standards are not met (as indicated in the prior section on incentives).

B) IFI ACCOUNTABILITY: International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and their member countries bear direct responsibility for upholding the above principles of full, immediate disclosure of all pertinent debtor government information.

The IMF bears, consistent with its mandate, primary responsibility for surveillance and the effective provision of early warning systems that serve to minimize the threat of financial crisis. In addition, the World Bank, BIS, and other international organizations have privileged access to a wide range of fundamental data and analyses that are critical to improving overall analytical quality, as well as the risk management and early warning systems employed by private sector creditors.

Suggested next steps for the IFIs to implement that would build upon the progress made to date include the following:

1. The IFIs, in particular the IMF, should develop more explicit and open “transparent” and “user-friendly” systems for assessing country information and disseminating it on a timely, open basis to all classes of creditors and investors. Given the importance of quality information as a “global public good,” current IFI outreach programs should be expanded with the institutionalization of ongoing product development, testing, and marketing functions, using the “best practices” of the private sector to develop data and information reporting fields, formats, and analytical applications that effectively interface with users’ needs. A first order of priority would be to enhance the current IMF and country web sites to more fully reflect user needs as well as the data and analytical improvements included in Recommendations three, four, and five of this report. It is critical that such institutionalized interfaces be aggressively expanded from that of the current outreach programs, to include a wider participation of primary suppliers of capital in the buyside, and a broader spectrum of experts in the larger analytic community, including country risk, credit, industry, and financial analysts from the buy-side, consultant, and academic communities.
2. The IFIs should individually enhance their respective regimes of incentives and penalties for timely, accurate and relevant country reporting of data and information. Five action steps are recommended:
   1. The IMF and other IFIs should clarify and publicize their current policies on sanctions for the misreporting of data (deliberate as well as inadvertent), detailing the individual cases and corrective actions taken.
   2. The IMF and other IFIs should publicly declare their commitment to enforce without exception their current sanctions for the deliberate misreporting of data, such as the IMF’s policy of compulsory repayment of IMF resources for countries deliberately misreporting data in order to meet IMF targets.
   3. Each IFI should review its existing charter, operating rules, and programs in forums with wide government and private sector participation, with the explicit objective of identifying constructive changes that would support the ability of the IFIs to perform their critical function of improving country disclosure systems to meet users’ needs.
   4. Each IFI should establish (or if existing, enhance) its Technical Assistance Program for Country Disclosure Programs, setting up explicit strategies with the necessary funding, experts, and technology resources to meaningfully assist governments with their country disclosure programs.
   5. The IFIs should coordinate their respective Technical Assistance Programs for Country Disclosure Systems, to insure cost-effective interfaces in data and information collection, integrated compilation of data, and seamless “user-friendly” formats that meet the wide community of user needs.
3. As with individual debtor country “Disclosure Programs,” each IFI country information system should be routinely audited by a credible independent third party. As with the external auditing by third party accountants of company financials, such a routine function would provide a neutral expert appraisal of needed process enhancements and individual data problems, facilitating transparency, prompt remedial action, early warning systems, and preemptive policy adjustments.
4. In all cases in which the public disclosure of government information is reported to be inaccurate or incomplete, by either internal staff or third parties, the IFIs are responsible for insuring timely confidential auditing of such disclosures by independent third parties. As well-evidenced by recent cases, one of the first “early warning” signs for countries undergoing financial stress may be deliberate data misreporting, or lack of timeliness. Again, an independent third party will be able to investigate such a concern in a more direct and timely way than the concerned IFI itself. Any party should be able to request such an audit on an undisclosed name basis, as investors and analysts in the private sector may have advance signals of problem areas before internal IFI staff.
5. The IFIs should establish more comprehensive ongoing “collaborative” networks with investors (especially buy-side investors), accountants, analytical services, law firms, NGOs, and others with the objective of obtaining accurate analyses of ongoing in-country developments. Exchanges between governments should be exchanged, as a means of developing and sharing “best practices.” Such an open exchange will improve analytical capacity, surveillance, and early warning systems of both county and market developments.
6. The IMF and the World Bank should be formally responsible for the timely generation of publicly available global and regional scenarios that reflect the range of global, regional, and country risk factors identified by internal staff through their privileged access to countries and market participants. Current scenarios provided in the IMF and World Bank publications should be expanded and updated on a more frequent basis as required by significant global, regional, and country developments. A primary objective would be to use these scenarios as a principal means of improving the capacity of the private sector to identify risks and factor those risks into decision making processes, thereby decreasing the likelihood of systemic market reversals and panic. Market participants and policymakers would be strongly encouraged to use these scenarios (as well as any other competing scenarios produced by private sector analytical services) in their risk management and early warning systems. To facilitate the relevancy and understanding of their scenarios, IMF and World Bank staff should be easily accessible for inquiries and debate.

C) REGULATOR ACCOUNTABILITY: Regulators from creditor countries, debtor countries, the BIS, and supporting IFIs bear direct responsibility for the open and timely evaluation of regulatory developments, banking systems, and risks resulting from market movements, such as reversals in capital movements or instrument risk.

The primary forums for stabilizing the global financial system are managed through regulatory interventions initiated by governmental and official multilateral working groups. The development of regulatory frameworks is considered the foundation to insuring a stable global financial system.

Suggested next steps for regulators and supporting organizations, such as the IFIs and related working groups, to implement include the following:

1. As key organizing agents, the BIS, IMF, and the Financial Stability Forum should provide more in-depth and regular forums for regulators to collaborate with the private sector in both debtor and creditor countries (investors, accounting firms, banks, corporates, law firms, analytical services, and others), with the objective of providing open reporting on country economic, financial, regulatory, and legal developments and collaborating in the evaluation of banking systems and early warning systems. Current outreach forums, while extensive in some regards, need to be expanded to insure a wider spectrum of input from both the investor and analytical community. The daunting challenge of these unprecedented issues also requires rethinking the formats for exchange, encouraging open brainstorming in the use of new technologies and methods for meeting regulatory and business requirements.

2. As a part of this process, these central organizing agents (the BIS, IMF, and Financial Stability Forum) need to assemble an easily accessible clearinghouse to which all regulatory issues are reported by global and national regulators, market participants, lawyers, analysts, NGOs, and others. This clearinghouse database, posted openly on the Internet, would serve as a central resource for timely and comprehensive information on regulatory issues key resource to both policymakers and market participants.

3. Regulatory bodies should expand their current efforts to identify market-related risks and enhance risk management systems in collaboration with investors and creditors. As explained in the next section on private sector accountability, this involves the establishment of more effective exposure reporting systems and support of market research that is focused on identifying key factors affecting market decision making and behavior.

4. In particular, creditor governments must enhance their regulatory supervision of their financial institutions to insure exposure strategies do not represent systematic risk to countries or the global financial system itself. As well-evidenced by recent financial crises, the regulatory systems of major creditor countries do not have the tools needed to identify potential systematic threats to their own financial systems, or those of other countries. The Chief of State in each major creditor country should prioritize the review of their country’s supervisory system, with the full and open participation of the private sector, NGOs, and regulatory officials of all countries.

D) PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY: Investors and creditors inherently bear the direct responsibility for developing their internal risk management systems that integrate assessments of macro risks, and for communicating information and data needs to governments and IFIs. Also, analytical services (such as the rating agencies) can serve a constructive role by immediately notifying debtor governments of any market developments or market perceptions that may result in adverse market conditions for that country. More timely and open notification to debtor governments of investor concerns and exposures would serve to avert or minimize market reversals by alerting governments in a timely fashion, providing a “window” for preemptive policy actions or needed explanations.

A more systematic means for identifying the risks posed by capital flows themselves is urgently needed. The interests of investors and creditors in reducing systemic financial risks are served by supporting the development of more “transparent” analysis of market risk, by providing information as needed on market exposures and market dynamics. Post-Asia crisis, there is widespread recognition of the risk capital markets themselves can potentially create for countries and the global financial system itself.

Some progress has been made in areas such as liquidity analysis, and working groups including IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) and the Financial Stability Forum are presently developing new proposals for exposure reporting of financial institutions and market analysis. However, these efforts have not to date provided policymakers and investors with easily accessible, quality data, or the comprehensive analysis of a country’s vulnerability to shifts in capital flows and the multiplier effects of financial meltdown from countries and individual institutions. Much more needs to be done in identifying credible mechanisms to track market exposures and identify potential vulnerabilities, in both domestic and international markets.

Suggested next steps that involve enhancing private sector accountability include the following:

1. Effective Exposure Disclosure Programs for creditors must be put into place, meeting the risk management requirements of both policymakers and investors. Current attempts in improving exposure reporting need to be reinforced and prioritized, with the objective of meeting two overall requirements. First, reporting has to be effective from the perspective of country policymakers, allowing them to identify potential vulnerabilities affecting their own countries in a timely manner, and to respond with preemptive measures. Second, these reporting systems must be explicitly linked to the macro analysis of global developments, allowing both investors and policymakers worldwide to identify potential cross-border vulnerabilities. To achieve these ends, the working groups currently in formation, involving the Financial Stability Forum and others, should be expanded to include a wider range of participants, and encourage a broader set of reporting system options for open debate and consideration. These efforts need to be more than “one-off” exchanges, with institutionalized forums that allow for ongoing collaboration between policy makers, analysts, and investors. For example, the pilot studies on exposure reporting now being circulated should involve country risk analysts, and be back-tested against recent financial crises to test effectiveness. The current exposure-reporting approaches are insufficient in capturing macro risk concentrations, as they do not identify common sources of risk or stress-test for possible global or regional scenarios. Such efforts, unless they are significantly revised, will not meet the objectives sought by regulators. (For suggested analytical approaches, see Recommendation Four, pages 24-29.)

2. The IFIs and creditor governments should support official-sponsored research programs on investor decision making. Despite the indisputable importance of understanding the behavior of private sector markets, little research has been done to better understand the actual decision making processes that shape investment and credit decisions. The IFIs should support the establishment of an extensive research program that documents the decision frameworks and externalities shaping investor and creditor behavior. This should include the analysis of regulatory and performance incentives as well as recommendations for how to improve the quality of risk assessments utilized in investor and creditor decision making. (For suggested research approach, see Recommendation Five.)

3. The private sector must take full responsibility for assessing risks, actively demand improved disclosure, and communicate data and information needs to governments and the IFIs. In short, creditors and investors must demonstrate to countries that disclosure truly matters. Further, investors and creditors share the burden of defining their data and information needs, and communicating those needs to the IFIs, governments, and country risk service providers. While many investors do not have the resource base to conduct in-depth primary country analysis, each should establish a competent independent analytical function within the firm’s decision-making process to identify macro risk factors, and integrate them into a qualitative risk management system. Deficiencies in this area can create systemic risk for the financial system as a whole.

4. Investors and creditors should actively use industry forums to collaborate, and communicate directly with government officials and IFIs. While competitive positioning will limit collaboration, investors and creditors can increase their analytical capacity and be more effective in expressing industry concerns through joint activities. It is important that investors, in particular bondholders, have forums to share experiences, express concerns and pose questions.

5. Analysts should communicate in an effective manner directly with debtor governments, expressing their concerns, using Country Disclosure Programs as one of the main venues. Creditor governments and IFIs should explicitly encourage such communications, setting up such programs and reinforcing the importance of these objectives. New organizations that are more representative of buy-side investors may need to be created as venues.

IV. RECOMMENDATION THREE: Expand the Current Approach to Improving Data and Transparency

The extensive measures undertaken by the IMF and others in this area of improving data and transparency are clearly important, but have proved insufficient to date for meeting the needs of the wider investment community for quality, timely and comprehensive analysis. If we are to expect investors to identify risks, then the official sector must assure them that they have the full set of data and information required for that task. The remaining problems are manifold:

• First, the traditional data sets are still lacking consistency of definition and timeliness, and may be inaccurate, especially in times of impending financial difficulty.
• Second, globalization and heightened economic interdependencies has created new linkages and vulnerabilities that require entirely new data sets.
• Third, data that is available needs to be provided in formats and through mechanisms that are more usable for the wide universe of users, through the Internet and other open forums.

Tremendous efforts have been made in this area of improving data quality and availability, but despite the dedication of major resources, major gaps of material import continue to exist. (Note: The Financial Stability Forum summaries the progress to date, including the Compendium of 12 Key Standards, at www.fsforum.org. Also, see various IMF web-sites.) These outstanding problems, however, cannot be fixed without addressing how to create new mechanisms and incentives that will facilitate the development of cost-effective and useful data and information.

OUTSTANDING GAPS IN DATA AND INFORMATION: The following list summarizes the ongoing problems in the provision of adequate country data and information:

1) NEED FOR STANDARDIZED REPORTING BASED ON INTERNATIONAL DATA DEFINITIONS: Despite extensive efforts and initiatives, continued problems with data continue to impair the quality of country risk analysis. While there is much public acclaim for the successes made to date, behind the scenes policymakers, analysts, and investors express their frustration at continuing problems of major proportion. As one rating agency analyst commented, “… one of the foremost requirements is that external debt data should be available on a full debtor/creditor/instrument and maturity basis. This requirement is rarely met in developed or developing countries.” Even when disclosure standards are agreed to, a key ongoing obstacle is the “politicization” of data disclosure; one analyst from a major commercial bank characterized the problem as follows: “Governments need to provide the broadest scope of data, and not pick and choose to make themselves look good.”

The success of the international company disclosure, implemented by the private sector body IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee) largely sponsored by the accounting profession, stands in stark contrast to that of the current state of country disclosure. Unlike companies, in the case of countries, those being audited –the countries – set the rules through their shareholder organizations such as the IMF and determine compliance. Direct country involvement in setting country disclosure standards, with limited direct involvement of independent country risk experts, has politicized the process, resulting in long delays in reaching agreements on data disclosure standards, as well as arbitrary implementation.

Specific examples given to date by Roundtable participants of ongoing data problem areas in traditional areas of economic and financial analysis include:

• Inconsistencies in reporting of government debt (e.g. in some cases it includes government-related debt, in other cases not)
• Incorrect debt maturities, especially with regards to the definition of short term debt (often long term debt that has short term options or swap contracts is lumped together with long term debt, when in fact it may be converted to short term debt under certain circumstances)
• Difficulty in identifying when foreign currency and fixed obligations result in cross-border risk (e.g., degree of matched funding, domestic debt indexed to foreign exchange rate, etc.)
• Amortization schedules are usually incomplete and not broken out by instrument (Note: Bonds in particular need to be broken out)
• Inconsistent and incomplete fiscal reporting (e.g., central and state government accounts not consistently broken out, “parallel” fiscal systems not reflected in published government budgets, etc.)
• Lack of documentation of government liabilities (e.g., banking, pension)
• Non-disclosure of forward contracts with reserves (elimination of all “window-dressing” of reserves)
• Non-disclosure of off-balance sheet liabilities in both the private and public sectors
• Need to include mutual funds in countries such as Korea (guaranteed returns not included in liabilities)
• Lack of standard definitions of banking system assets, especially non-performing loans
• Unavailability of complete information on external capital availability (e.g., FDI, portfolio flows, commercial bank lending, expected IMF and other official sector funding, etc.)

2) NEED TO FURTHER DEVELOP NEW DATA AND INFORMATION REPORTING FIELDS: It is widely understood that quality country risk analysis, as well evidenced by the Asian crisis, requires more than the standard assessment of the balance of payments and national accounts. All key parties agree that country analysis must also include a comprehensive assessment of the country’s banking, financial, regulatory, legal and political systems, as well as regional and global interdependencies.

However, the increased interdependence of today’s sovereign economies has magnified multifold the imperative of expanded analysis and data. The globalization of financial, trade, and production across sovereign borders has changed the basic configuration of the global economy itself. And this new global economy, as it emerges, needs to be charted, its workings defined and measured, in as precise and timely ways as possible.

This analytical imperative would be greatly facilitated by the development of new data and information formats (“templates”) on these aspects of countries and their interdependencies, easily accessible in one central Internet site. A partial preliminary list of specific suggestions of the types of data and information that would facilitate more integrated and comprehensive country analysis include:

• Trade, production, and financial cross-border linkages: dependencies on regional trade or single large markets like the US; dependencies on commodities or other volatile exports or imports; currency dynamics relative to region and global scenarios (e.g., dollar zone currencies such as the Argentine peso strengthen when global condition deteriorate); exports with large import inputs dependent on maintaining current cost (vulnerability to exchange rate depreciation or other import cost increases); cross-border financial linkages such as dependency on single instruments and /or one class of investors or creditors likely to act in unison (e.g., loans from Japanese banks; investors that are likely to pull capital out of country in event of a financial crisis in another country or changes in investment conditions, such as higher global interest rates)
• Banking systems: number and type of banks; asset composition and quality; lending criteria; ownership; structure of liabilities; data on currency and maturity mismatches, off-balance sheet liabilities, etc.
• Regulatory systems: supervisory structure and processes for financial sector (e.g., staffing, actual number of audits, history of banking problems and specific penalties, etc.); indicative examples of the ability to regulate banking system; etc.
• Financial systems: development of domestic capital markets, including relevant regulatory, tax, legal, and clearing/settlement systems; depth and breadth of private and public savings; availability of information and independent credit ratings; openness to foreign participation; etc.
• Legal systems: overall review of country’s legislative scope (e.g., inclusion of key functions and quality of process); specific history of investor and creditor issues (such as bankruptcy cases and minority shareholder protection); duration and types of resolution; etc.
• Political systems and social structures: overall openness and freedom to debate country issues within financial, policy making, and NGO communities; key actors, agendas, and resources; composition of legislative bodies, tenure of administration, number, structure, and function of political parties; voter history; polls on key issues; performance of government in meeting basic needs (e.g., life expectancy; infant mortality, diffusion of telephones, computers, televisions, etc.); demographics; etc.

3) NEED FOR IMPROVED DATA FORMATS: Users will be able to decipher data better if it is provided in formats that facilitate comprehensive analysis. Examples include:

• Comprehensive overview of data definitions, with all data issues detailed
• Provision of data in ready-made analytical formats (e.g., time series of at least 5 years, standard ratio analysis, etc.)
• Funding gap analysis: Balance of payments data (historical and projected) should be organized around the central issue of assessing any projected funding gaps, and identifying all underlying country and global assumptions
• Stress testing analysis: All countries have critical risk factors (exogenous and indigenous) that need to be routinely tested for sensitivity. For example, the balance of payments assumptions on interest rates, commodity prices, and capital availability need to be tested using a range of projected estimates. The data and formats provided by the central data institutions should accommodate this imperative of testing country’s vulnerabilities, and employing scenario analysis.
• Explicit identification of country interdependencies: Data and formats should highlight key areas of interdependencies, such as imports needed for exports; key export markets; dependence on capital providers by instrument, country, maturity; global and regional competitiveness issues, examining global sectors and global demand; etc.
• Explicit recognition of country data reporting issues: All data fields that are of questioned integrity for any reason should be explicitly tagged in each location cited, with a full explanation of the problem.

4) NEED FOR IMPROVED DATA DELIVERY MECHANISMS: Users are less apt and able to use data if it is costly and difficult to access. Providers of data should work more closely with users to insure cost-effective delivery systems. Examples of suggested enhancements include:

• Central easy-to-find web sites for locating country data (eliminating multiple sites); and
• Provision of easy-to-access help desks to assist in answering data and information questions.

PROPOSED MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVING THE PROVISION OF DATA AND INFORMATION: Continued problems in attaining the required level of quality, relevancy, and timelines of data and information will persist unless new mechanisms and incentives are aggressively put into place. A preliminary summary of possible measures that could streamline this important process include:

1) NEED FOR “DEPOLITICIZED” GLOBAL DEFINITION PROCESS: Despite extensive effort in data and information enhancements, the significant residual problems of definitions, timeliness, and integrity will not be improved unless there is a less politicized global framework for defining definitions and insuring its quality. This process should be coordinated by a central professional organization (such as a country risk professional association as noted in prior section) with broad responsibility for both identifying a common global framework, as well as defining the priority reporting needs distinctive to individual countries. This central professional organization should actively involve the investor and policymaking communities in defining these reporting definitions and needs, as well as in providing data. As noted, the accounting profession’s successful leadership role in defining and implementing accounting standards can provide helpful guidance for the development of independent professional expertise in further enhancing country disclosures.

2) FURTHER DEFINE COUNTRY AND IFI PROCESS FOR PROVIDING “GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD”: TIMELY, ACCURATE DATA ON BOP AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS IN EASILY USABLE FORMATS: There needs to be wider recognition in all communities that quality, timely country data and information are “global public goods” that all governments, and their membership organizations, have vested interests in providing to the larger public. While the IMF will need to continue its leadership role given its privileged access to governments and its existing infrastructure, a more open and inclusive process is needed. This new process needs to recognize the huge imperative of improving existing data and information, providing new data and information (as noted in the prior section), as well as the need to meaningfully institutionalize input from the investor and analyst communities. The provision of these improved and new sets of country data and information should be considered “global public goods” that serve to promote informed decision making in both the investor and policy-making communities.

As discussed in the prior section, countries and the IFIs, need to have more user-friendly, timely interactive systems for data and information disclosure. Specifically, further efforts are needed to bring in the private sector and others in defining data and information needs, formats, and web site functionality. Moreover, as indicated in the earlier section, the country risk profession should take the lead role in defining reporting standards, which would then be reflected in the IMF principles of operation, enabling it to simply implement the reporting process, and insulating it from the pressures of shareholder governments. All public groups working on improving the global financial architecture, such as the Financial Stability Forum, need to promote this concept, and work hand-in-hand with the investor and analytic communities to operationalize it.

3) ESTABLISH PENALTIES ON COUNTRIES FOR FALSE, INCOMPLETE, AND UNTIMELY REPORTING TO THE IFIs: The IMF, BIS, and other IFIs could simply implement the standard guidelines developed by the global professional organization mandated to define country-reporting requirements. As noted in several recent cases, the IMF has received faulty and incomplete data from reporting countries, as countries undergoing crisis are often tempted to manipulate their accounts or delay submission of key data. In order to effectively counter this possibility, the IFIs and its member countries need to reinforce the criticality of adherence to these reporting requirements through a myriad of methods, such as direct negotiations, reinforcement in national regulatory regimes (creating “market” rewards for quality disclosures), and tying to IFI and government aid programs and loans. As noted in recommendation two on IFI accountability, harsh penalties should be a certain outcome for any country that deliberately manipulates its reporting.

Other key players in the global financial system can serve as key allies in this process, strengthening incentives and penalties. For example, credit evaluation and news services such as the rating agencies, country risk services, and the financial press can issue “market warnings” whenever country disclosures are incomplete, misleading, or not timely. In particular, country rating agencies can incorporate disclosure requirements into their rating criteria, downgrading country ratings or outlooks if disclosure standards are not met. Creditor and investor organizations can also play important leadership roles in communicating private sector concerns to debtor governments. Further, as detailed earlier, important creditor countries and their membership organizations can play critical roles in convincing other governments of the importance of establishing high disclosure standards, and assisting them in this process.

4) ESTABLISH BROADER-BASED REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVED DATA DISCLOSURE. As noted in the earlier section on accountabilities, national and international regulatory authorities can provide powerful mechanisms by informing investors of country disclosure practices, and further by restricting market access to only sovereigns that have sufficient “Disclosure Programs” in place and are committed to improved disclosure requirements within defined time frames. The SEC data requirements for Yankee bond issues have been successful in raising the disclosure standards for emerging market issuers. The expansion of these regulatory requirements to other markets, including home markets, would provide strong market-based positive incentives for the improvement of data. Furthermore, corporates from countries that have not complied with such country disclosure requirements may also be restricted from access to key markets such as the US. Another regulatory venue are capital allocation rules, such as the Basle accord proposals which may link countries’ risk weights to adherence to the IMF’s SDDS (Standard Dissemination Disclosure Standards).

5) ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND AUDITING MECHANISMS FOR ALL DATA AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURES. Countries, like companies, need to have effective support mechanisms in the preparation and review of their economic and financial data. This would entail the provision of the following support functions to countries:

• Detailed documentation clearly specifying data definitions and reporting guidelines should be published, with documented examples of unacceptable practices (such as “window dressing”, etc.);
• Ample technical assistance and funding for implementation;
• Staff available to answer questions and help resolve reporting issues, revising and updating data reporting definitions and guidelines as needed; and
• Funding of professional third party independent auditors to review all submissions.

V. RECOMMENDATION FOUR: Revamp Current Risk Management Models and Regulatory Approaches with More Robust Qualitative Methods

All parties agree that the Asian crisis has underlined the limitations of commonly used analytic approaches, in particular fixed-income sovereign ratings and Value-At-Risk models, as accurate indicators of financial vulnerability and the potential for crisis. While recent surveys indicate some refinement of these approaches, risk management models in place across the financial sector, including those envisaged in BIS and other regulatory processes, continue to rely principally on these same mechanisms. Recommendations from the IIF and others have underlined the importance of overlaying qualitative analytic methods, such as scenarios and stress testing, systematically on these quantitative approaches and risk judgments. The main obstacles to implementing these recommendations are twofold: 1) need to develop simple ways to integrate these more qualitative models into current decision making structures, interface with rating systems, and regulatory frameworks; and 2) lack of independent, quality research that meets this criteria, and that is easily accessible and affordable for the wider investor community. While there is general agreement in the country risk community on the types of analytical approaches and outstanding problems, significant difficulty still impedes the actual provision of these suggested enhancements in country analyses provided today, as detailed below and in the section on recommended next steps.

OUTSTANDING PROBLEM AREAS: The analytical challenges of country risk analysis in today’s environment are daunting in scope, as outlined in last year’s Roundtable Report (see Attachment) and in the retrospective debate on “lessons learned” from the Asian crisis. A summary of outstanding problem areas that require further improvement include the following:

1) EXPLICIT IDENTIFICATION OF BOP FUNDING GAPS AND POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES: The standard format for country risk reports has traditionally included historical data and projections on the country’s balance of payments (BOP). However, these formats do not usually explicitly document estimates of the country’s projected funding gap, assumptions on funding sources, or associated vulnerabilities that could potentially result in debt service difficulties. In order to formulate appropriate policies and investment decisions, users of such BOP data and projections need as much clarity as possible (“transparency”) in relating BOP analyses to key conclusions on the potential for debt service difficulties, and key sources of vulnerability. As noted in the prior section on data, a major problem continues to be the lack of standard definitions for existing data, as well as the lack of information and data on key cross-border interdependencies.

2) DEVELOPMENT OF MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY RISK ISSUES: Traditional formats for analysis have often separated the different analytical disciplines of economics, politics, finance, and industry analysis, with geographic specialties further isolating country assessments from regional and global assessments. However, end users of country risk analysis must be assured that all potential risk factors have been integrated into the final conclusions of each country risk analysis, or are explicitly noted as omissions. This is a formidable challenge in today’s environment of escalating interdependencies, requiring expert evaluations on the country’s regulatory, legal, financial, and political systems, as well as of critical linkages with the global environment. While some progress has been made, further enhancements need to be made in developing explicit methodologies for evaluating domestic and exogenous risk factors, and equally important, coordinating the various areas of expertise. Again, as noted in the prior section on data, a major initiative is needed in this area.

3) MORE SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF MARKET RISK: Post-Asia crisis, there is widespread recognition of the risk capital markets themselves can potentially create for countries and the global financial system itself. Some progress has been made in areas such as liquidity analysis, and working groups are presently developing new proposals for exposure reporting of financial institutions and market analysis. However, these efforts have not to date provided policymakers and investors with easily accessible, quality data, or the comprehensive analysis of a country’s vulnerability to shifts in capital flows and the multiplier effects of financial meltdown from countries and individual institutions. Much more needs to be done in identifying credible mechanisms to track market exposures and identify potential vulnerabilities, in both domestic and international markets.

4) MORE EXPLICIT ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION OF COUNTRY INTERDEPENDENCIES: As noted in the prior section on data, despite the heightened attention given to contagion and cross-border channels of transmission, much remains undone in assuring users of country risk assessments that full consideration of a country’s vulnerabilities to external factors has been fully integrated in the conclusions of the country risk analysis. Greater efforts are required in two areas: the development of cross-border linkage data bases that fully document potential sources of vulnerabilities; and the development of frameworks that integrate the analysis of such data into country risk assessments. Key areas of focus include the following risks: financial cross-border linkages (e.g., suppliers of capital, cross-border currency mismatching, currency vulnerabilities, etc.); trade dependencies (e.g., export and import markets, commodity prices, etc.); vulnerabilities to debt service capacity (including export dependency on imports, and breakdown of debt profile by instrument and supplier country); and the country’s ability to compete globally.

5) INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ANALYSIS OF POLICY DECISIONS: Policy choices are critical to economic growth, and the avoidance of financial crisis. All too often, country analysis has focused on the data, and not the detailed analysis of policy mixes that serve to either preempt crisis or escalate its potential. Country analysis needs to explicitly evaluate the quality of policies, critical tradeoffs between policies, and any uncertainties associated with the implications of policies on growth, interest rates, the health of the banking system, and the overall country economy. And as well evidenced by the Asian crisis, critical policies are not only issued by governments, but also by the International Financial Institutions and their member governments, and require open debates in expert forums that facilitate thorough reviews of implementation procedures and potential ramifications. In short, the assessments of both country and IFI policy risk are intrinsic components of the risk analysis associated with international lending and investment.

6) IDENTIFICATION AND TESTING OF ALL MATERIAL ASSUMPTIONS: Very often country assessments and judgments are based on assumptions of critical importance that are not explicitly identified or stated in the written country risk analysis. This impedes the isolation of critical risk factors, and open debate of underlying critical assumptions, which is of particular importance given escalating interdependencies and the need for more coordination among experts. Examples of key assumptions that need to be identified and tested are those relating to exchange rates, political structure, policy options and constraints, the availability of capital, growth rates, interest rates, commodity prices, export markets, and the overall global environment. Further, it is critical that new open expert forums be created for the testing of these and other critical assumptions, which encourage the open exploration of the prevailing “conventional wisdom,” and allow for thoughtful consideration of unconventional, unpopular and minority views.

7) NEED FOR MORE SOPHISTICATED ABBREVIATIONS OF ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS (such as ratios, templates, ratings, etc.): Users of country risk analysis require useful abbreviated judgments that can then be utilized in their decision making processes. Much of the recent debate has underlined the misuse of the fixed-income ratings of the global rating agencies, as well as the inadequacies of risk management systems (such as Value-at Risk) in integrating macro and country risk analysis. However, operative substitutes for these existing shorthand risk assessments have not yet been developed and disseminated in meaningful ways. The providers of country risk data and analyses need to work closely with the user communities -- developing new shorthand rankings, ratios, templates, and other abbreviated risk conclusions-- that better meet user decision needs.

8) PROMOTION OF QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES THAT INCORPORATE UNCERTAINTIES AND INTERDEPENDENCIES (such as development of scenarios, threshold stress testing, and mapping sensitivity to changes in key risk variables): The renewed application of quantitative methods in global financial markets has created renewed vulnerabilities in financial markets, as many of these methods do not adequately reflect the uncertainties and risks actually embedded in portfolios and exposures. Specific initiatives are strongly recommended:

• Qualified use of quantitative risk management systems and models--such as Value-At-Risk-- with explicit recognition of assumptions, limitations, and uncertainties;
• Further development and application of alternative global scenarios that identify key uncertainties, systemic risks, and potential implications for regions and countries;
• More systematic analysis of global industry sectors and instruments (such as bonds), identifying risks specific to those instruments and sectors.
• Expanded use of quantitative and qualitative variables related to private sector, economic linkages, and exogenous variables; and market liquidity; and
• Systematic identification and incorporation of political risk and country vulnerability to shifts in investor and creditor sentiment.

RECOMMENDED MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES FOR DEVELOPING IMPROVED ANALYTICAL APPROACHES: There is an urgent need to create new mechanisms and incentives to meet the analytical objectives stated above. A preliminary list of suggested initiative follows:

1. CREATE MORE EFFECTIVE FORUMS FOR EXPERT EXCHANGE AND SETTING OF GLOBAL STANDARDS: The Roundtable and other user groups should review the existing traditional formats provided by the IMF, rating agencies, and country risk services with the objective of proposing new formats and supporting methodologies that more explicitly meet these analytical requirements. Such forums need to insure the full inclusion of expertise - economic, political, social, and financial - including regional and global inputs. Further, a wide range of experts from the private, official, academic, and NGO communities need to contribute their perspectives to insure balanced and independent analyses and effective interfaces with user needs.

   Analysts and investors should expand the range and depth of the independent analytical sources they use for analysis. Specific steps include the expanded use of independent analysts such as academics, journalists, consultants and corporate and banking sources to assess private sector health and competitiveness; explicit input from technical experts on global industry issues such as commodities; and stakeholder analysis to assess political systems, including opposition and vested interests. Other specific suggestions on measures to institutionalize such expert forums follow.

2. USE OF INTERNET: The Internet can be more fully employed as an effective organizing mechanism and clearinghouse to aggregate and distill such exchanges between diverse experts.

3. REESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTRY RISK PROFESSION ASSOCIATION: The accounting profession has “depoliticized” the establishment of accounting standards through its national and international organizations, successfully setting standards that are increasingly effective in establishing market confidence and transparency. Similarly, the country risk profession can be the lead influence in establishing similar standards for country risk analysis and reporting, that can then be reflected in global reporting standards used by the IFIs and others.

4. INITIAL SUPPORT AND FUNDING FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES: In today’s market, the majority of country risk professionals are not employed, as accountants are, in independent profitable line of businesses, but rather as support staff in marketing and credit functions. In contrast to the accounting profession, the country risk profession may need more leadership and funding from official and other sources to be instrumental in the development of international standards. Such a role for the official sector is justified by the undeniable importance of quality country assessments to the stability and prosperity of governments and their citizens.

5. OFFICIAL-SPONSORED RESEARCH PROGRAMS ON INVESTOR DECISION MAKING: Despite the indisputable importance of understanding the behavior of private sector markets, little research has been done to better understand the actual decision making processes that shape investment and credit decisions. The IFIs should support the establishment of an extensive research program that documents the decision frameworks and externalities shaping investor and creditor behavior. This should include the analysis of regulatory and performance incentives as well as recommendations for how to improve the quality of risk assessments utilized in investor and creditor decision making.

6. MORE SYSTEMATIC COORDINATION BETWEEN PRIVATE SECTOR, GOVERNMENTS, AND IFIs: Despite a strong historical tradition of close collaboration, the current relationship between private sector financial institutions and the official sector has developed a significant degree of distrust and misgivings that undermines the confidence imperative to the healthy workings of the global financial system. The IMF, the World Bank, and country governments should enhance their communications with investors and creditors with more interactive and ongoing “outreach programs” and established “liaisons” to work on the development of methodologies, data provision, and specific policy issues. In addition, the official sector should focus on providing more comprehensive and timely rationales for country policies and performance assessments, with timely explanations of significant country developments.

VI. RECOMMENDATION FIVE: Modify Current Performance Measures, Regulatory Regimes, and Analytic Input to Facilitate Use of Quality Data and Analysis in Investor Decision Making

With the recent financial crises, the notion that “markets” reward performance has been discredited in the eyes of many. Many analyses of the Asian crisis have acknowledged that inadvertently both regulatory and market factors skewed capital flows, accentuating systemic risk and market herding. Despite this recognition, however, little research has been conducted that identifies how current regulations and market performance benchmarks may serve to unintentionally distort investor decision making, and what changes would realign fundamental analysis as the basis for decision making, so that performance is rewarded with the availability of affordable capital.

In order to better understand market behavior, it is imperative that research be immediately conducted in this area. The workings of externalities such as performance benchmarks and regulatory regimes are insufficiently understood, despite their huge importance for understanding the direction and magnitude of capital flows. The basic theory underlying “free” markets assumes quality analysis of fundamentals, and that superior performance and open, quality information are rewarded with the availability of inexpensive capital.

In reality, however, performance benchmarks often-skew investor decision-making away from fundamental analysis. Two areas are commonly cited:

• The first is the general “herding” problem associated with short term performance criteria; returns are tangible and certain in the very short-term, while the prospects of realized risks are intangible and hard to access in terms of magnitude and timing. If one’s competitors are showing higher returns, given their high-return, high-risk investments (in Russia, for example) -- despite your risk assessments -- you are pressured to follow suit, or risk losing out in terms of return, clients, and performance reputation.
• Another related issue is how performance benchmarks themselves are constructed. Analytics are replaced with a standard prescribed composition, based on the components of the index. If the index provider deems to include a certain instrument, you are obliged to include that in any of your products based on that index, despite any risk assessments you might have. Further, the inclusion of that instrument in the index creates a “herding” effect, in that all competing products will by virtue of the index funds have to review whether they need to include that instrument in their products to remain competitive in the marketplace.

Regulatory regimes are also widely understood as primary factors in investment decision making, sometimes in unintended ways that create market risks. The most commonly cited recent case, now in the process of revision, is the Basle capital allocation rules. Despite the huge attention given to this issue, however, insufficient research has focused in systematically identifying how such regulations (and any revisions) in fact influence actual decision making processes. The traditional process of asking for private sector response does not accomplish this objective, as firms will posit the answer they perceive to their advantage, rather than share any analysis on how it might alter their capital allocations and decision making processes per say.

The suggested approach is to conduct in-depth confidential interviews with key decision-makers who constitute a representative sampling of key investor and creditor classes, charting the decision-making process and its key determinants, for emerging market investments. The research should be conducted by trusted third parties that can insure confidentiality of participants and individual responses.

VII. NEXT STEPS

The workings of the global financial system have become more complicated and vulnerable in the wake of global interdependence and an expanded investor base. If the global financial system is to be strengthened for the benefit of both investors and countries, the recommendations stated in this report are urgently in need of implementation. Credibility, expertise, and open exchange are essential to the well functioning of the expanded global market and the provision of adequate capital.

Immediate, essential next steps suggested in the report that would serve to advance these underlying preconditions to a well-functioning global financial system include:

1) Official Sector Adoption and Adherence to the Suggested “Principles” (cited in the report Recommendation One), with more open routine and institutionalized broad communication with the wider investor community (especially directly with buy-side): Key IFI and governmental parties worldwide should openly endorse and implement these basic principles which assure investors of their rights to information and organization.

2) Official Sector Implementation of Suggested Measures for Improving Data and Information, and the Ease of Access (for the larger investment community), such as:

• IFI and government endorsement of credible third parties for the independent audits of government and IFI data and information (in accordance with basic rules of corporate finance for independent accounting audits);
• More comprehensive, meaningful, and ongoing IFI and government consultation with private sector country risk experts and investors (especially buy-side), including more in-depth and routinized Outreach Programs to experts in country risk analysis and buy-side investors in the areas of standards, the design of information and data web sites, and support of analytical methods;
• IFI and government support for more useful and accessible Internet platforms for disseminating information and analysis, and interactive exchange of viewpoints, facilitating individual country web-site development that better enables direct investor and analyst exchange; and
• IFI and government support of independent research providers and development of Country Risk Profession, using applicable “best practices” whenever possible from the accounting profession and corporate finance.

3) IFI and Government Funding of Market Risk Research (to be conducted by third parties): Immediate new initiatives are needed to identify cost-effective means for assessing material exposure risk concentrations, or externalities such as regulations or performance benchmarks that may inadvertently result in costly market herding.

Please provide all report comments to Barbara Samuels, Roundtable Project Director, at samuels_barbara@bah.com, or 212-358-9660.

APPENDIX: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS

ROUNDTABLE WORKING GROUPS

1) SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING WORKING GROUP
The Sovereign Debt Principles Working Group consisted of individuals with wide ranging expertise in the global financial system, as well as recent sovereign bond restructurings, from both the investor and policy making communities.

Participants included: Carl Adams (Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.); Derrill Alatt (UBS Warburg); Peter Allen (Independent Consultant); Lee Buchheit (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton); Richard Buckholz (Goldman Sachs Asset Management); Clifford Dammers (IPMA); Wilma Davis (John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company); Richard Gitlin (Bingham Dana LLP); Robert Gray (HSBC Corporate Banking); Eric Hermann (FH International Financial Services, Inc.); Gary Kleiman (Kleiman International Consultants, Inc.); Vitaly Lisovenko (Ukraine MOF); Abigail McKenna (Morgan Stanley Investment Management); Ben Miller (HBK Investments); Walter Molano (BCP Securities, LLC); Jay Newman (Elliott Associates, L.P.); Barbara Samuels (Samuels Associates); Sergay Storchak (Vnesheconombank); Tom White (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company); Andrew Yianni (Clifford Chance); and Daniel Zelikow (JP Morgan).

Observers included: Gavin Bingham (BIS); Matthew Fisher (IMF); Daniel Gleizer (Banco Central do Brasil); Sean Hagen (IMF); Ann Misback (Federal Reserve Board); Michael Nelson (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Anne Salladin (U.S. Department of Treasury); Brad Setser (U.S. Department of Treasury); and David Wall (Bank of England).

2) DATA AND METHODS WORKING GROUP
The Data and Methods Working Group consisted of individuals with extensive longstanding expertise in country risk analysis, and investors in emerging markets.

Participants and Observers included: William Bixler (MetLife); Dan Bond (Ambac Assurance); Omar Borla (Fleming); Uwe Bott (GE Capital); Chris Canavan (Goldman Sachs); John Chambers (Standard and Poors); Niles Chura (American Express); John Clark (New York Federal Reserve); Terese Feng (FITCH IBCA); Frank Fernandez (Securites Industry Association); Lacey Gallagher (Credit Suisee First Boston); Dale Grey (World Bank); Gary Kleiman (Kleiman International Consultants, Inc.); Roger Kubarych (Council on Foreign Relations); Karen Morr (CIA); Joydeep Mukherji (Standard and Poors); Jay Newman (Elliot Associates); Martin Parkinson (IMF); David Roberts (Bank of America); Barbara Samuels (Samuels Associates); Sergay Storchak (Vnesheconombank); David Wall (Bank of England); and Neil Wigan (FITCH IBCA). (Please note: Other input was received from confidential interviews with Asian and Latin American central bankers, other government officials, and investors.)

ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS IN GENERAL MEETINGS 10/98 – 8/00

Carl Adams (Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.); Kamal Ahmad (Morrison & Foerster, LLP); Peter Allen (Consultant to bondholder creditor committees); Andrew Aran (Alliance Capital Management International); Edmar Bacha (BBA Securities Corp.); Leslie Barcus (Citibank); Merli Baroudi (Economist Intelligence Unit); Jim Barrienau (Alliance Capital Management); Javier Baz (TCW); Amar Bhattacharya (The World Bank); Matthew Bishop (The Economist); Craig Blessing (Chase Asset Management); John. Bohn (GlobalNet Venture Partners); Enrique Boilini (Farallon Capital); Dan Bond (Ambac Assurance Co.); Jack Boorman (IMF); Omar Borla (Robert Fleming Incorpoprated); Uwe Bott (G.E. Capital); Robert Broadfoot (Political & Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.); Ernest Brown (Morgan Stanley & Co.); Lee C. Buchheit (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton); Richard Buckholz (Goldman, Sachs Asset Management); Matthew Burrows (U.S. Mission to the United Nations); Chris Canavan (Goldman, Sachs & Co.); John H. Carlson (Fidelity Investments); Michael Cembalest (J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc.); Michael Chamberlain (Emerging Markets Traders Association); John Chambers (Standard & Poor's); Joyce Chang (Chase Securities Inc.); Jonathan Chanis (Caxton Corp.); Bo Yung Chung (Bank of Korea); Dominique Clavel (American International Group, Inc.); William R. Cline (Institute for International Finance, Inc.); Sam Cross (Columbia University); W. Bowman Cutter (E.M. Warburg, Pincus & Co., LLC); Willma Davis (John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company); Andres de la Cruz (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton); Eli Whitney Debevoise II (Arnold & Porter); Robert Dineen (Shearman & Sterling); Rafael Docavo-Malvezzi (Technology Holdings International); Amy Falls (Morgan Stanley & Co.); Therese Feng (FITCH IBCA); Frank Fernandez (Securities Industry Association); Stephen Fidler (The Financial Times); Matthew Fisher (International Monetary Fund); Wayne Forrest (American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce); Arminio Fraga (Banco Central do Brasil); Stephen Friedman (Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.); Lacey Gallagher (Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation); David Garlow (AIG Investment Corporation); Anna Gelpern (U.S. Department of the Treasury); Richard Gitlin (Bingham Dana, LLP); Lawrence Goodman (Global Economic Associates LLC); Mary Goodman (Moore Capital Global Strategies); Dale Gray (World Bank); Francisco Gros (Morgan Stanley Brazil); John (Sean) L. Hagan, Jr. (International Monetary Fund); David D. Hale (Kemper Investment); Hari Hariharan (Santander Investments); Mitchell Hedstrom (Citibank); John Hennessy (Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation); Cathy Hepworth (The Prudential Insurance Co. of America); Eric R. Hermann (FH International Financial Services, Inc.); Christine M. Y. Ho (The G7 Group, Inc.); George Hoguet (State Street Global Advisors); Ann L. Hollick (State Department); Robert Hormats (Goldman, Sachs & Co.); Yasheng Huang (Harvard Business School); Lyric Hughes (China Online, LLC); Chris Hume (Fitch IBCA Limited); Michael Hunter (Dart Management Inc); Shafiq Islam (BRN Associates); Paul Jabber (Gefinor (USA) Inc.); Henry Jackelen (United Nations Capital Development Fund); Dan Jones (Marvin Zonis and Associates, Inc.); David Jones (National Security Council); Rajeev Joshi (CVC Investment Management); Himmat Kalsi (The World Bank); Cem Karacadag (International Monetary Fund); James Kelly (Salomon Smith Barney Inc.); Edward Keon (Prudential Securities); Eung Jin Kim (Bank of Korea); Gary Kleiman (Kleiman International Consultants); Mahesh Kotecha (Structured Credit International Corp.); Roger Kubarych (Council on Foreign Relations); Emilio Lamar (Columbus Advisors); Eugene Lawson (U.S.-Russia Business Council); Jonathan Lemco (National Policy Association); Paulo Leme (Goldman, Sachs & Co.); David Levey (Moody's Investment Services); Marc Levinson (Chase Securities); Frank Linden (Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.); Wayne Lyski (Alliance Capital Management Corporation); Michael Maguire (MBIA); Douglas Makepeace (Sperry Fund Management Corporation); Armando Bravo Martinez (World Policy Institute); Scott McDonald (KRW International); Michael McDonnell (Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.); Wesley McGrew (U.S. Department of the Treasury); Abigail McKenna (Morgan Stanley Asset Management); Arthur K. McMahon (Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks); William Milberg (New School University); Benjamin Miller (HBK Investments); Anne Misback (U.S. Federal Reserve); Walter Molano (BCP Securities); John Moore, Jr. (Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.); Karen Morr (Central Intelligence Agency); Joydeep Mukherji (Standard & Poor's); Brian Murray (AIG Investment Corporation); Leonel Narea (Coutts & Co.); Michael Nelson (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Jay Newman (Elliot Associates, LP); Mark Niland (Hartford Investment Company); Nancy Northrop (Alliance); Michael F. Oppenheimer (Global Scenarios, LLC); William Overholt (NOMURA Securities International (Hong Kong) Ltd.); Hugh Peyman (Government Research Works); Jorge Pinto Mazal (Consulate General of Mexico); Peter Plaut (Bank of America); Arturo Porzecanski (ABN AMRO Inc.); Susan K. Purcell (Americas Society/Council of the Americas); Nadine Rihani (The First National Bank of Chicago); Bruce Roberts (Central Intelligence Agency); David Roberts (Bank of America Securities, LLC); Rita Rodriguez; Frederick Roggero (United States Air Force); David Rolley (Loomis Sayles & Co., L.P.); Paul Sacks (Multinational Strategies, Inc.); Anne Salladin (U.S. Department of the Treasury); Barbara Samuels II (Samuels Associates); Marco Santamaria (Lehman Brothers); Jaime Sanz (Duff & Phelps); Antranig R. Sarkissian (Citigroup); Brad Setser (U.S. Department of the Treasury); Frances Seymour (World Resources Institute); Eshagh Shaoul (American International Group, Inc.); Harvey Shapiro (Institutional Investor); Roger Shields (MBIA Insurance Corporation); Michael Silva (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Dorothy Meadow Sobol (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Francis Stankard (American Express Bank, Ltd.); Joseph Taylor (Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.); Gabriel Torres (FITCH IBCA); Thomas Trebat (Salomon Smith Barney Inc.); Vincent Truglia (Moody's Investors Service, Inc); Thomas White (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.); Malcolm H. Wiener (The Villa Candia); Neil Wigan (FITCH IBCA); John Wilton (The World Bank); Robert Windorf (Salomon Smith Barney); Alice Young (Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler); Daniel Zelikow (JP Morgan); Marvin Zonis (Marvin Zonis & Associates, Inc.); Barry Zubrow (Goldman, Sachs & Co.)

ATTACHMENT: YEAR ONE REPORT FROM CFR ROUNDTABLE ON COUNTRY RISK

Key Recommendations From Discussions 10/98-9/99

In the two years since the July 2, 1997 devaluation of the Thai baht, countless commentaries have addressed the causes of and remedies for the Asian financial crisis. Yet remarkably little attention has focused on the glaring weaknesses of the country analysis process itself: Why did virtually no analyst in either the investor or policy communities foresee the depth or duration of the Asian crisis and its far-reaching consequences for the Asian countries, other emerging markets, and the industrial countries? What can be done to improve our ability to assess vulnerabilities, risks, and channels of contagion, enabling investors and policymakers alike to minimize the economic, political, and social costs of future financial crises?

Leading members of the country risk community conducted a series of Roundtable discussions from the fall of 1998 through the fall of 1999 under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, with the objective of developing recommendations for how to improve the quality of country risk assessments utilized by investors and policymakers. Participants included leading country risk practitioners (from rating agencies and other country risk services, commercial banks, and the investor community), as well as government officials and analysts (from the International Financial Institutions, the U.S. government, and borrowing country governments).

The recommendations set forth below are intended to provide a summary of the most important observations and suggestions made by members of the Roundtable. Since the purpose of the Roundtable was to provide a forum for a wide-ranging exploration of issues and solutions, no effort was made to reach consensus on the wording of specific recommendations. However, members expressed strong general support for the thrust of the conclusions below, and no participant dissented on any major points.

The recommendations are in three principal areas: Analytical Country Risk Methods; Structure of the Country Risk Profession; and the Use of Country Risk Analysis in Decision-Making. The recommendations cut across market and regulatory structures, which suggests the need for a serious collaborative approach in improving analysis and its use in the decision-making process. Roundtable participants urge key decisionmakers in both the private and public sector to consider these recommendations seriously, as the increased use of high-quality, relevant country risk assessments by investors, lenders, and policymakers would decrease excessive market volatility and improve policymaking, serving to minimize the economic and social costs resulting from financial crisis.

I. ANALYTICAL COUNTRY RISK METHODS
Analytical capacity in the country risk profession has been outpaced by developments in the global environment, given the unprecedented changes across economies, political structures, and societies, amplified by increased global, regional, and interregional interdependencies. While some improvements have been made to analytical methods and data collection over the last twenty-four months by a number of country risk analysts, the speed and depth of the historic transformations occurring in our global environment underscore the need for further modifications. Following are a number of concrete steps that our group identified to improve the analytics of country risk assessment:

1) All country risk analysts and investors should routinely utilize analytical frameworks that explicitly recognize the increased complexity, interdependency, and uncertainty of the global environment. Specific measures include the following:

• Standard usage of qualitative assessment techniques that incorporate uncertainties and interdependencies, such as development of scenarios, threshold stress testing, and mapping sensitivity to changes in key risk variables;
• Explicit identification and testing of key assumptions embedded in country assessments, especially those related to exchange rates, political structure, policy options and constraints, and the global environment;
• Qualified use of quantitative methods and models--such as Value-At-Risk-- with explicit recognition of assumptions, limitations, and uncertainties;
• Expanded use of quantitative and qualitative variables related to private sector, economic linkages, and exogenous variables such as commodity prices and market liquidity; and
• Systematic identification and incorporation of political risk and country vulnerability to shifts in investor and creditor sentiment.

2) Country risk services and analysts should expand beyond the traditional focus on country reports to routinely include global, regional, sector, and instrument reports that facilitate more targeted identification of portfolio concentration risk. A more precise identification of risks requires that the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), rating agencies, and other country risk services that routinely prepare reports recognize more macro risks, as well as how those risks relate to different sectors and instruments. Analysts need to focus reports on the following: a) global scenarios that identify key uncertainties, systemic risks, and potential implications for regions and countries; and b) global industry sectors and instruments (such as bonds), identifying risks specific to those instruments and sectors.

3) Primary government providers of data and analysis, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the BIS, and country governments, should collaborate more closely with country risk analysts, investors, and lenders to identify priority gaps. Specific taskforces should be organized around this objective, and should include private sector analysts, with the goal of augmenting the individual analyst’s risk assessment capacity through the improvement of data and analysis from mulitlateral and government sources. Key areas of focus for the Taskgroups include the following risks: currency and maturity mismatching; vulnerabilities in a country’s balance of payments profile, including breakdown on debt profile and debt amortization by instrument; and a country’s economic interdependencies, the health of its private sector and banking system, global competitiveness, political and social cohesiveness, and overall sustainability of policies. Such timely and relevant data and analysis should be made available through expanded web sites.

4) The IMF, the World Bank, and country governments should enhance their communication with investors and creditors, by providing more comprehensive and timely rationales for country policies and performance assessments, and by explaining significant country developments. The use of Internet technology would facilitate the dissemination of and access to information by all groups, improving the investor community’s capacity to analyze and exchange views on key issues. Specific recommendations include the following: a) enabling more user-friendly downloading, graphing, and analytics applications; and b) constructing private Web Intranet sites to facilitate open collaboration and interactive dialogue on data and analyses.

5) Analysts and investors should expand the range and depth of the independent analytical sources they use for analysis. Specific steps include the following: appropriate use of rating agency output, with an understanding of intent and scope; expanded use of other independent analysts—such as academics, journalists, consultants and corporate and banking sources—to assess private sector health and competitiveness; explicit input from technical experts on global industry issues such as commodities; stakeholder analysis to assess political systems, including opposition and vested interests; and full utilization of IMF and World Bank analysts, analyses, and data.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY RISK PROFESSION
The structure of the country risk profession has evolved to support securitization, decreasing the individual analyst’s capacity to openly provide independent, long-term assessments of country fundamentals and systemic risks. Profit motives and other vested interests have led to increasingly biased assessments. As a result, even when data is sufficient and warning signals are ample, a correct and timely assessment may not be forthcoming. The result is an amplification of the costs of the crisis. To correct this problem, a number of definite structural and collaborative measures are required:

1) Investors and lenders need access to more independent country risk assessments for their analyses. Independent providers must compete against free sell-side research that is provided as a marketing function to private-sector clients. To encourage the growth of independent country risk services, as well as lower their cost, policymakers should collaborate with the private sector in the following steps:

• Review how the private sector can be rewarded for use of independent analyses through changes in regulation and supervision;
• Provide public- and private-sector funding for independent assessment services (e.g., government outsourcing, government funding of research projects and professional organizations, collaborative industry funding of shared research, etc.); and
• Determine the appropriateness of regulatory and other measures to enhance the objectivity of sell-side research (e.g., separate research and marketing functions at investment banks, clearer definition of Chinese Wall, etc.).

2) IFIs should focus analytical resources on building the relevant economic and financial databases and overall analyses needed to support the investor and policymaking communities. To accomplish this, the IFIs need to partner with the private sector through ongoing collaborative fora involving country risk analysts in key institutions. These fora should leverage profession-wide expertise in identifying potential risks and preemptive strategies. Immediate next steps for the IFIs include the following:

• Establishing focus groups and panels, including the private sector, governments, and academics, to collaboratively define data and analytical specifications;
• Setting forth an analytical framework for data collection, including identification of areas of global dependence (e.g., trade dependencies, vulnerability to shifts in market sentiment, etc.) and possible channels of transmission and contagion;
• Enhancing existing standardized databases on national accounts, BOP, debt structure and amortization schedules, financial sector health and developments, social and political indicators, and adding data fields as needed; and
• Elaborating on conceptual frameworks to guide user analyses of data.

3) IFIs and country risk service providers should enhance their capacity to provide interdisciplinary analysis on all potential sources of country risk. Further advances need to be made in the establishment of objective criteria and data provisions for evaluating critical aspects of each country (such as systemic and global interdependencies, global competitiveness, policy issues and tradeoffs, strength of the national banking system, adequacy of the country’s regulatory regimes, independence of the legal system, independence of monetary and interest rate policies, resiliency of the political system, etc.).

4) Country risk analysts need to institute a professional group that would serve to establish and disseminate “Best Practices” for the country risk profession. Critical functions would include the following:

• Establishment of guidelines through collaborative fora and published materials;
• Promotion of such guidelines in university graduate and executive training programs;
• Provision of data and analytical specifications to private sector, governments, and IFIs;
• Updating “Best Practices” on an ongoing basis, providing for feedback to educational fora; and
• Promotion of an interdisciplinary approach, which incorporates political, social, economic, and financial analysis.

III. THE UTILIZATION OF COUNTRY RISK ASSESSMENTS IN DECISION MAKING
Even when available, quality country risk assessments are often inadequately integrated in decision making processes because of two factors: the large role of externalities influencing market behavior, as well as inadequate interfaces between assessments and decision making processes. To the extent that market behavior is commonly affected by these two factors, they are the potential source of mass-market movements, reversals and systemic risks. Significant action steps are urgently required:

1) Industry leaders and associations should revise performance benchmarks, incentive systems, and accounting regulations as needed to reward fundamental assessments and reduce costly market volatility. Immediate measures include:

• Setting up research projects on the above topics with wide participation of the investment community, policy makers, and academics;
• Establishing taskforce(s) with participation of fund managers, commercial bankers, and policymakers to review research results and propose revisions; and
• Engaging the accounting community in the review of how mark-to-market accounting rules can be revised to reduce market herding and panic selling.

2) IFIs and governments need to review how national and international regulatory regimes might better reinforce quality, fundamental long-term assessments. Key next steps include the following:

• Review regulatory exposure guidelines for international commercial banks, insuring disclosed exposures correctly reflect risk profile and do not spur regulatory-induced exposure reductions unrelated to fundamental assessments of risk;
• Evaluate BIS capital allocation guidelines, insuring loan decisions are not skewed on the basis of capital allocation guidelines rather than fundamental assessments of risk; and
• Revisit existing U.S. government regulations on pension fund regulations, such as ERISA.

3) Regulatory authorities, private sector professionals, country risk service providers, and multilaterals should collaborate in enhancing a) the relevancy of the framework utilized in risk management models; and b) the actual usage of assessments in decisionmaking. Immediate implementation of the following is recommended:

• IFIs and independent country risk services provide greater coverage of alternative global scenarios and analysis of possible high-impact events, which can be utilized by market participants.
• Private sector participants modify current risk management models to include scenario overlays, political uncertainties, and possible systemic risks as identified by their own analysis and by others. Pricing decisions should be explicitly tied to risk judgments.
• Regulatory agencies monitor overall performance of internal risk management models in adequately testing for risk concentrations and high-impact events.
• All parties insure basic credit payback analysis of individual transactions—clearly identifying the source and vulnerabilities associated with servicing of interest and principal—is fully integrated into the analysis of portfolio and risk concentrations.

The recommendations provided above are to be further developed in a second series of Roundtable discussions to be held at the Council from November 1999 through June 2000. For more information, please contact the Roundtable’s Project Director, Barbara Samuels (telephone 212-358-9660, fax 212-358-9642, samuels_barbara@bah.com).