From the conference Biotechnology and Ethics: A Blueprint For The Future

Fundamentals of Ethics

Mark Sheldon
Head, Department of Philosophy
Indiana University

First, I want to point out that moral theories are not, necessarily, to be confused with Truth. Rather, they reflect the effort to think with clarity about very complicated areas of human thought, action, and conviction. Intuitively, we all have ideas about how to address and respond to the ethical dilemmas we encounter. For instance, we might think that doing our duty, as we perceive it, is most important. Or we might think that doing what is in the best interest of all involved is the best thing to do. In other words, we might be focused on the consequences of our actions. Moral theories, I think, represent the attempt to develop these intuitions, or assumptions, as carefully and as systematically as possible. They reflect the attempt to engage in critical reflection about the various ideas we have, attempting to explore the implications of taking one view or another.

Philosophy is the attempt, at least in part, to be as conscious as possible about the concepts we employ in thinking about the various activities in which we engage. We are constantly evaluating the logic of our thoughts and assumptions. Sometimes philosophers are accused of saying the obvious, but what is important is how and whether the arguments and reflection get us where we're going.

Before I talk about three specific moral theories, the ones appealed to most often, I would like to say something about Law, Religion and Custom in order to distinguish these from morality. Sometimes there is confusion about these categories. Then, I want to say something about Ethical Relativism, the view that there is no right and wrong independent of any particular society. If this view is correct, it is often argued that morality becomes subjective and hardly worth talking about apart from making clear the different subjective views that people hold.

Morality makes reference to right and wrong behavior with regard to certain basic values. Right and wrong are defined by reason in relation to specific values. Moral theories differ in regards to the values in question, and the weight specific values are given in relation to each other, but generally the theories are concerned to alleviate suffering or promote well-being. Morality is often described as appealing to conscience and reason.

For Law, right and wrong are defined by a legislative body. Law threatens punishment from civil or institutional bodies.

For Religion, right and wrong are defined by authoritative scripture or revelation. Eternal reward or punishment is often perceived as being involved.

For Custom, the notions of appropriate and inappropriate are central. Tradition provides the basis for determining what's appropriate. Punishment comes in the form of social approval or social condemnation.

The discipline of Anthropology has had a major impact, this century, on the way we think about society. It has led to the view called Cultural Relativism. This is the view that societies differ profoundly in regards to the values supported, the ends pursued, and the meanings that are attached to various activities. This view has transformed earlier assumptions regarding the relative sophistication of certain societies, particularly Western societies, as compared with others. In addition, it is a view that has been regarded as so influential that it is often perceived as providing strong evidence for the validity of Ethical Relativism. The evidence is taken to be so strong, in fact, that the views are sometimes confused with one another.

Cultural Relativism is the observation that societies differ in regards to fundamental values and the ways in which living is organized. It is basically descriptive, indicating factually what is observed by anthropologists doing field work. Ethical Relativism is the belief that there is no right and wrong in any absolute sense, beyond what is perceived to be right and wrong in the sense of convention in any particular society. Does Cultural Relativism provide evidence that Ethical Relativism is True? It is possible to raise at least three possible objections to the view that Cultural Relativism is evidence for the validity of Ethical Relativism:

1. A closer analysis of the evidence accumulated by the anthropologists reveals deeper similarities and only apparent difference. For instance, societies may differ in regards to specific practices, but be alike in valuing what these specific practices are supposed to accomplish.
2. Differences from one society to another can be explained as a result of ignorance of right and wrong on the part of some (or all) societies. This does not mean that we know who knows what's right, but only that some does (or might, since it is not necessarily the case that anyone does).
3. The use that we have for the notion of moral progress (or moral failure) seems to suggest that we have access to some perspective independent of the society in which we live. What actually constitutes moral progress is a complicated issue, but that we have any use for the notion seems to imply that we stand outside society in some objective sense. We may not, actually, but it does seem contradictory to argue that there is no such thing as right and wrong independent of a particular society and still have use for the notion of moral progress within that society, particularly when such a judgment seems to involve employing an idea new to that particular society or any society.

I will discuss three basic approaches. In very general ways, I am going to provide a description of each approach and, then, briefly, indicate difficulties that are associated with these approaches.

The name is a clue to the basic notion in the theory. The Greek word "deon" means "duty." A deontological moral theory takes the view that an action is right because it is a duty, and not because of any other reason. That is, an action is right not because it conforms with human nature. An action is right, simply, because it is what duty or obligation requires.

Two versions of deontological moral theories are Judeo-Christian Ethics and Kantian Ethics. Judeo-Christian Ethics, for many, is based on The Ten Commandments. This is a list of basic duties that believers are obligated to perform. Of course, as the Talmud and Christian commentary make clear, things may be more complicated than they first appear, but basically what is required is following God's will. Of course, this begs the question of what God's will is, and the basis on which we know this. Faith? Revelation? And then, of course, we have the problem of properly characterizing what we mean by these concepts.

The philosopher's name most associated with deontological moral theory is the 18th century German thinker Immanual Kant (1724-1804). For Kant, morality is fundamentally characterized in terms of the intention with which one acts. One can act out of compassion and one can act on the basis of inclination, but neither of these would constitute acting morally. Morality involves acting with the pure intention of performing one's duty.

To identify the content of duty, Kant developed the notion of the categorical imperative: "Act only that which you can at the same time will to be a universal law." In other words, act on a rule that would apply to everybody, including yourself. Can one lie if one expects that others will not lie to him? Some have suggested that Kant's idea resembles the Golden Rule, but the Golden Rule appeals to individual sensibility in relation to what one would want for oneself. Kant is appealing to the rational element of willing, that one should act in a way that does not logically allow one to make an exception for oneself. In other words a will at odds with itself is not a pure will or one aiming purely to act with the intention of performing one's duty.

Another major aspect of Kant's thought is that persons are always to be treated as ends, never as means. This leads to concern for the rights of persons. Deontological ethics often involve a focus on rights and principles, the latter, in part, being the origin or foundation of professional codes. I say "in part" since professional codes are often as much about the image the profession wants to project to the public as they are about statements of principle meant to guide the profession internally.

1. Even if we agree that fulfilling our obligations or performing our duties is what behaving morally is all about, how do we know what our duty is? While Kant's idea of universalization seems to support the notion that duty is a central feature of morality, it does not tell us what specific duty we have. In addition, and this is in relation to religious ethics, it does not necessarily help us to point out that we ought to follow God's will since we still have to determine what that is.
2. Even if we agree concerning which specific duties are obligatory, what do we do when these duties conflict with each other? We shouldn't lie, but not lying may hurt someone. We need further understanding of how to assign priority to one duty or the other.
3. Deontological moral duties provide a basis for talking about rights. But what do we do when these rights come into conflict?

4. The role Deontological theory assigns to feelings seems problematic. It seems odd to think that compassion, guilt, remorse, and sympathy, for instance, do not play a central role in the moral life.
5. Deontological theory does not take into account the consequences of our actions, and this, given that consequences can often be devastating, seems very strange.

Consequentialist moral theories emphasize consequences. An action is right because of the consequences to which it leads. The question becomes what constitutes the right consequence. A very popular consequentialist moral theory is Utilitarianism, a view most often identified with John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Mill argues that the right consequence is whatever leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Other utilitarians argue for other ends: the most pleasure, the least pain, etc. Still, the focus is not on intention, motive or duty, but consequences. An action is right because it leads to good consequences and bad because it leads to bad consequences. The end justifies the means if the end truly consists of a greater balance of good over bad (however good and bad are interpreted).

Some utilitarians have attempted to develop what they view as a more sophisticated version of utilitarianism, called Rule-Utilitarianism. While the Act-Utilitarian focuses on each and every act to determine its consequences in relation to the overall good, the Rule-Utilitarian focuses on general ways of acting and argues that these general ways of acting ought to be evaluated in relation to the overall good. Subsequently, specific acts will be evaluated in terms of these general ways of acting. For example, the rule-utilitarian might take the position that lying is not right because telling the truth generally has the best consequence for human affairs. The act-utilitarian will want to consider the specific act of deception in order to determine its particular consequences.

1. Can we predict, with certainty, the consequences of our acts? The issue of the "slippery slope," where results occur that are not originally intended, is certainly a question that arises here.
2. When we are aiming to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, what specific group should we have in mind? How do we identify and set limits to the group that ought to demand our attention and consideration? To what extent and in what circumstances, for instance, should we be concerned about future generations?
3. A major attraction of the basic formula, that we ought to try to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, is that it is very simple. But it may be too simple: it appears that it can be satisfied in an infinite number of ways. For instance, should we be concerned about the greatest happiness for the greatest number, or the greatest happiness for the greatest number? And the questions multiply further since there does not appear to be any directions concerning how the good should be distributed among the members of the group.
4. Utilitarianism, in its focus on consequences, seems to disregard the rights and interests of individuals. I owe someone money. He forgets that I owe it to him. He has a lot of money and I have a better use for the money than he does, anyway. I decide to keep it. This seems to indicate a lack of concern for obligation and integrity, often regarded by many as significant moral concept.
5. The theory also seems prepared to sacrifice individuals to achieve the good for the group. To the extent that this is true, this seems profoundly unfair. In other words, to the extent that the theory demonstrates a lack of concern for what is fair, it lacks a theory of justice.
6. Proponents do not agree concerning what ought to be maximized. The version I mention above focuses on happiness. But others will argue for maximizing pleasure, and others, in negative terms, the a voidance of pain.

This is the view that ethical judgments relate to or follow from scientifically discoverable facts about human nature. The theory moves from a description of human nature, or a view of the place of human beings in the world or the universe, to conclusions concerning how we ought to behave, the purpose with which we ought to live, or the objectives we ought to pursue. Naturalistic moral theories are teleological in focus, but, unlike utilitarianism, the reference point is not the collective good, but a specific good defined or identified by the theory of human nature in question. Examples, for instance, of thinkers who share this approach are Aristotle, Aquinas, and Freud. Aristotle argues that the good for any entity is achieved when it lives in a way that fulfills its purpose. Empirical and philosophical investigation lead him to conclude that human beings, with their capacity for reason, achieve their highest purpose when engaged in philosophical contemplation. For Aquinas, human behavior should conform to natural law, which reflects, in turn, Divine Law. What is derived through reason and revelation serves as a basis for this conclusion. For Freud, his scientific investigations purportedly establish the basis for his claims concerning what constitutes normalcy and maturity. In all of the above approaches, what is descriptively established to be true serves as the basis for claims put forward concerning what, normatively, ought to be regarded as true. The good is defined in terms of what is best in us, or normal or fully mature, or consistent with what God wants of us.

1. There are difficulties in determining the validity of the science (or theology, in the case of Aquinas) on which the theory is based. Whether at issue are the findings of psychology, anthropology, biology, genetics, or any other science, how can we be certain that the descriptive content identified as the basis of the theory is correct? How do we know, for instance, what paths are consistent with our nature, or what choices fulfill our potential?
2. Is it possible to conclude, as Jean-Paul Sartre does, that there is no such thing as human nature? If so, what are the implications if this is true? Might we conclude that anything is possible?
3. What exactly is the relationship between fact and value? Even if we know with certainty what constitutes human nature, what, in fact, makes us happy, does it follow that we ought to pursue that thing? If it is true that we desire pleasure, that, in fact, it is natural for us to do this, does it follow that we ought to value pleasure? It would appear that we need an additional argument to support the claim that we ought to value pleasure, aside from the fact that we naturally do.
4. Science enables us to discover many things and achieve much. A naturalistic ethics has a strong built-in tendency to give significance to this knowledge and these achievements. However, should we necessarily value this knowledge, seek these achievements? Doesn't the danger of "the technological imperative" loom here? That is, aren't we very likely to conclude that because we can do something that we automatically should do it? We fail to recognize, perhaps out of habit, perhaps because we live in an essentially pragmatic society geared to solve problems, that an additional argument is required to support any conclusion concerning what we should do.

This discussion has hopefully provided some clarification regarding the possible approaches to, and problems associated with, resolving ethical dilemmas. The fact is, that ethical decisions are among the most difficult and most important decisions that we face. There is, I think, no easy way to make these decisions or feel certain that we have made the right decision. We are not likely to develop a moral technology that will make the solutions simple.

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Northwestern University