(Prepared for the NGO Forum on Food Sovereignty and the NGO Regional Consultation Process for the World Food Summit+6)
15 January 2002

"During the 1990s, the number of undernourished persons in the developing countries fell each year by a totally inadequate average of 6 million. As a result, the number of persons suffering hunger will have to be reduced by 22 million each year if we are to achieve the World Food Summit objective by 2015. At the present rate, it will take more than 60 years to reach this objective."
FAO Director General Jacques Diouf, "Statement" to the 31^st Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization, 2-13 November 2001.

"It’s important for our nation to build -- to grow foodstuffs, to feed our people. Can you imagine a country that was unable to grow enough food to feed the people? It would be a nation subject to international pressure. It would be a nation at risk. And so when we’re talking about American agriculture, we’re really talking about a national security issue."
U.S. President George W. Bush in remarks to the Future Farmers of America
July 27, 2001 -- Washington, DC

"Nowhere in the solemnly declared war on hunger has there been anything like the mobilization of money, personnel or political will for the multi-billion dollar war on terrorism. Even the focal organizer of the war against hunger has faced funding problems. Declining real support for the FAO as more resources go to political priorities like Afghanistan undermine the words of support [for the war against hunger]."
Barry Wilson, "Canadian food aid, then and now," THE WESTERN PRODUCER, 3 January 2002.

1. The World Food Summit (WFS) Plan of Action makes no mention of the term "food sovereignty" as such. However, national sovereignty in achieving food security was recognized as essential for achieving the WFS goal of halving the number of hungry people from 800 million to 400 million by 2015. In the "Rome Declaration on World Food Security," government delegates agreed that achieving the WFS definition of food security ¹ "is a complex task for which the primary responsibility rests with individual governments." As a result of the responsibility assigned to governments for achieving food security, delegates concluded that "[f]ood should not be used as an instrument for political or economic pressure," since the use of such an instrument would limit the sovereignty of individual governments to exercise their responsibility in implementing WFS commitments. The NGO Forum to the WFS likewise addressed the issue of sovereignty in stating that "[n]either food nor famine can be used as a national or international political weapon. ... Economic embargoes or international sanctions affecting populations are incompatible with food security. Those currently in place must be terminated."²
2. The WFS debate over a sovereign right to food was fierce. A U.S. official reported to Congress that "the United States would be prepared to see the summit not go forward if agreement could not be reached"³ to qualify the right to food as merely an "aspirational goal," rather than an obligation of signatories to the United Nations’ "Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights." In a post-WFS "interpretive statement" the United States declared that "fundamental right to be free from hunger" was a "goal or aspiration to be realized progressively that does not give rise to any international obligations."⁴ Removal of technical and financial barriers to implementing the WFS "Plan of Action" is not made easier if FAO members refuse to recognize a right to food and a right to resources to produce food for hundreds of millions of hungry persons. Indeed, many of the policy platforms adopted by NGOs/CSOs at the FAO regional consultations assert a rights based foundation for achieving food security and poverty eradication. For example, they "adopt a rights-based instead of a welfare approach to development work where entitlements for peasants are demanded on the basis of their rights and accountability of governments and other institutions are required because it is their duty to protect and uphold the rights of peasants."⁵ "Recognition of the rights, autonomy and culture of indigenous peoples in all countries [is] an imperative requisite for combating hunger and malnutrition."⁶ Asserting these rights in a legal instrument is part of the work of the NGO Forum, although the history of the right to food debate at WFS suggests that resistance at WFS+6 to a food sovereignty framework for fulfillment of WFS commitments will be staunch.⁷
3. Another part of the NGO Forum’s work, undertaken here, is to analyze some trade-related barriers to fulfillment of WFS commitments and to propose multilateral policies for food sovereignty that can fulfill those commitments as present policies have not. A food sovereignty policy platform begins with the recognition that "[f]ood sovereignty is the right of each nation and its peoples to maintain and develop its own capacity to product the people’s basic food, while respecting productive and cultural diversity. Food sovereignty is a pre-condition for a genuine food security."⁸ While most programs to achieve sovereignty in resource management and food production and distribution are locally oriented,⁹ government resources that could support such programs have been diverted to financing export agriculture and developing capacity to implement trade agreements, even among FAO members with considerable degrees of food insecurity. Hence, NGO/CSO food sovereignty policy platforms have both criticized trade policies that have negatively affected food sovereignty and proposed multilateral means that would allow governments to support local food sovereignty initiatives.
4. The right of a nation to grow its own food, as recognized above by U.S. President George W. Bush, is not, of course, a right that should be enjoyed by just one nation or group of nations. The effective realization of the right to food is essential to national sovereignty, according to developing countries that have proposed in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) a "Development Box" of binding provisions for food security and rural development. That proposal states "[u]nder GATT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs] Article XXI, national security issues may be exempted from WTO trade disciplines. Food security is also inextricably connected to national security and political sovereignty. Chronic food insecurity puts national security in jeopardy by placing at risk, the health of a large number of people, and also because it incites internal turmoil and instability."¹⁰ In November 2001 in Qatar, WTO member governments refused to include a mandate to negotiate Development Box provisions in the Declaration of the WTO Ministerial. In asking for reference to the Development Box in paragraph 13 of the Declaration, fourteen WTO members noted that AoA-facilitated "large-scale imports for many of our countries are synonymous with importing unemployment and food insecurity."¹¹ This refusal came as David Wilcox, co-coordinator of the Food and Agriculture Agency’s food insecurity mapping project, admitted that since WFS, "if you subtract China['s reported decrease in food insecurity], the balance sheet [of food insecurity] is increasing."¹² To help governments and civil society organizations prepare during the WFS+6 process to review implementation of the WFS "Plan of Action", this paper summarizes for debate research on food security impacts of trade liberalization and proposals for multilateral means to food sovereignty.
5. Policies contributing to the failure of unsubsidized agricultural trade to sustain prosperity for most farmers and to the failure to make substantial progress in reducing the number of undernourished people cannot be analyzed strictly in terms of markets and "trade concerns." "Free" trade advocates like to claim that "WTO talks are about trade. Nothing more."¹³ Such claims ignore so-called "non-trade concerns" invoked in the non-binding preamble to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and in the AoA’s Article 20. More importantly, they ignore well-documented studies on negative effects of WTO trade liberalization rules that impede the realization of "non-trade concerns," such as food security and rural development. This paper reviews trade-related aspects of WFS commitments, some impacts of agriculture trade under AoA rules, WTO member proposals for reducing food insecurity, and possible non-WTO multilateral policy means towards making food sovereignty sustainable. Rather than understand food sovereignty as an "aspirational goal" of agricultural trade, food sovereignty strategy consider that "make[s] food sovereignty and not agricultural trade the basic concept of international debates."¹⁴ Six multilateral policy proposals for food sovereignty are considered here: 1) implementing the Marrakesh Decision on means to alleviate the negative affects of the AoA for Least Developed and Net Food Importing Developing Countries, as called for in the WFS Commitments; 2) regional basic food reserves; 3) a global food security convention; 4) WTO disciplines to phase out agricultural dumping; 4) policies grouped in an AoA "Development Box"; and 5) a formalized and annual NGO report to monitor government programs to realize WFS objectives and implement the WFS Plan of Action.

6. Non-governmental organization policies towards realizing food sovereignty have been proposed for the national and local determination of food self-sufficiency and right food related resources in response to the erosion of food security resulting, in part, from the implementation of agricultural trade liberalization policies.¹⁵ Already in the preparations for the WFS, Via Campesina, a coalition of peasant and farm organizations, had declared that "[W]e are determined to create a rural economy which is based on respect for ourselves and the earth, on food sovereignty and on fair trade."¹⁶ More recently, in the preparations for the postponed World Food Summit; five years later (WFS:fyl), a policy platform to achieve food sovereignty has been outlined. For example, the Asian FAO Regional Consultation for WFS;fyl recommended that FAO and other intergovernmental organizations, "Support measures that restore food sovereignty to peasants where the people themselves can have control over the productive resources and make decisions on matters regarding their food security and discourage the establishment of corporate farms and big commercial fishing corporations."¹⁷ Similarly, the African NGO consultation for WFS:fyl recognized that the dominant model of African agricultural production, peasant family agriculture, needed government technical support and protection against the dumping of highly subsidized agricultural exports by transnational corporations at below the cost of production.¹⁸
7. The determination to achieve food sovereignty confronts agricultural policies whose primary purpose is not to ensure food security, but to facilitate a kind of trade whose benefits largely accrue to its proponents. Most food security for most countries is achieved through domestic production, often by subsistence farmers without any of the taxpayer-funded technical assistance, subsidies and credits available to large-scale farmers and transnational agribusiness.¹⁹ Perhaps only 10 percent of global food production is traded internationally.²⁰ But despite the relatively small role of internationally traded food in achieving global food security, agricultural policy and prices among WTO members are increasingly determined and financed for the sake of trade.
8. Proponents of agricultural trade liberalization believe that trade creates food security "self-reliance" by generating "hard" currency reserves with which to buy imports of food.²¹ Empirical reviews of the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round have shown this belief to be without foundation for most WTO members, but with grave consequences for national food security. For example, the Philippine government predicted a 20 percent annual increase in agricultural export income as a result of the AoA rather than the resulting 1995-1998 12 percent drop in export income.²² Import surges of subsidized corn and rice, largely from the United States, drained Philippine foreign exchange reserves, turned the Philippines from a net food exporter to a net importer, and helped to drive two million farmers off the land without any of the social safety net promised before the Uruguay Round but not implemented after it.²³
9. More broadly, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) commented, after an extensive review of the food import costs for developing countries, "closing the food gap through commercial imports is not a realistic possibility for most countries that have poor prospects for substantial increases in foreign exchange earnings and/or already face heavy external debt burdens."²⁴ In a survey of the "Relative importance of agriculture in selected WTO member countries", FAO shows that food import costs "as a percentage of total export earnings minus debt service" are more than 50 percent for 6 members and more than 25 percent for 18 members, compared to one to five percent for developed country members.²⁵ In light of its analysis, FAO recommended to AoA negotiators that "given the magnitude of the food security problem in poorer WTO members, increased, rather than decreased, support to agriculture in these countries is required for greater agricultural productivity and production growth."²⁶ Despite this and other analyses that demonstrate the need to remove AoA barriers to food sovereignty, proponents of agricultural trade liberalization are extremely reluctant to acknowledge any negative effects resulting from the AoA, much less a need for renegotiating the AoA to enhance food security in developing countries. For example, at a WTO NGO Symposium, the Finnish negotiator for the AoA during the Uruguay Round declared, in remarks not contained in his written summary of the Symposium, that the global price collapse in agricultural commodities resulting from overproduction for trade was unrelated to AoA provisions.²⁷
10. The debate over the role of trade in the provision of food security is ostensibly intellectual, but traders can back their arguments with an economic and political power that other parties in the debate lack. Transnational agribusiness representatives argue that the unequal distribution of natural resources for food production dictates that "natural" exporting countries should supply food to countries with poor natural resources for growing their own food. For example, a recent paper by the International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food and Trade (IPC), a group of transnational agribusiness representatives, contends that "[I]n the past, food security concerns, often expressed in terms of the need for food self-sufficiency, have been used to prevent the liberalization of trade. Developed and developing countries alike have argued that domestic food production was necessary to ensure food self-sufficiency and therefore food security. At the most basic level, this notion is flawed, because the distribution of natural resources necessary for food production (water, soil and climate) does not correspond to the geographical distribution of the population, and therefore to food demand."²⁸ This is an extension to agriculture of the comparative advantage theory, according to which countries are to produce those goods in which their natural resources give them comparative advantage. The theory is suspect on a number of counts, not the least of which is that the theory, as first formulated by the eighteenth century economist David Ricardo, assumed that financial capital would largely remain within national borders.²⁹ If the Brazilian real and the Argentine peso were not subject to capital flight, currency devaluations and unregulated speculative attacks on currencies, the comparative advantage of such "natural exporters" would have resulted in wealth that would have diminished poverty and food insecurity.
11. Such comparative advantage arguments about food security potential can be rebutted to differing degrees for most countries not at war or suffering from natural disasters. (This caveat points to situations with grave food insecurity consequences. FAO estimates that "[a]s of September 2001, there were 34 countries and over 62 million people facing food emergencies [emphasis in the original]."³⁰) However, the political and economic power of transnational agribusiness corporations may make the intellectual purport of a rebuttal irrelevant to government officials who believe that their national interest lies in complying with the interests of borderless corporations. As one analyst has written, "[t]he logic of globalization has led, in fact, to a redefinition of national interest, at least in the United States, in which government policy assumes that advancing the well-being of shareholders and global firms -- as opposed to the general population, workers and communities -- provides the highest overall benefit."³¹ In accord with this assumption, IPC representatives met with national delegations in October 2001 in Geneva to press their arguments for WTO policies to make the critical margin of food security import dependent on agribusiness firms in "natural exporters" such as the United States, Australia and Argentina.³²
12. The disposition of government officials to identify their national interests with those of borderless corporations derives, in part, from fear of the market and political power of those corporations and the governments that advocate their interests. Developing country diplomats listening to such arguments may believe that they cannot propose, much less implement, policies to overcome trade related barriers to food sovereignty without offending companies that might provide a critical margin of food security in a year of insufficient crops. Furthermore, the AoA effectively affirms a binding right to export by virtue of minimum market access requirements.³³ Given that the large majority of developing countries are "more or less self-sufficient in food (+/- 10%)",³⁴ the percentage of food security supplied by trade is small, but critical. Great political power rests with those who can set the terms and costs of preventing political unrest due to possible food shortages. The 4-5 percent minimum import access required of each WTO member, regardless of need ³⁵ is an AoA provision that inhibits national food self-sufficiency, and hence sovereignty, in basic foods.
13. Economists, governments and intergovernmental organizations have largely refrained from analyzing the role played by international trading companies when trying to understand why commodity markets and agricultural trade policy do not work as they are supposed to according to economic theory.³⁶ Despite the public funding of transportation infrastructure, insurance and export credit subsidies for these companies, the data of their quasi-state trading enterprise transactions is regarded by major exporting country governments as private, and hence their global impact difficult to analyze.³⁷ It is not possible in this paper to provide a fuller analysis of the role of these actors but their influence on trade policy, as well as on trade itself, cannot be overstated. NGOs have made valiant attempts to analyze corporate initiatives to make food sovereignty a market privilege. But only governments and intergovernmental organizations have the resources and legal authority to enforce food sovereignty policies that benefit all sectors of civil society, not just the so-called private sector. One NGO has suggested that "[t]he creation of a new UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, with an expanded mandate to monitor and analyze multi-technology and multi-sectoral mergers and alliances, is long overdue."³⁸

14. The sovereign responsibility of individual governments to implement WFS Commitments is qualified implicitly in the WFS Plan of Action by the commitments made by those governments to international agreements that require national laws to be changed, abrogated and/or added. The agreements mentioned most frequently in the Plan of Action are the WTO agreements. The Plan of Action notes that "It is essential that all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) respect and fulfill the totality of undertakings of the Uruguay Round. ... The Uruguay Round Agreement established a new international trade framework that offers opportunity to developed and developing countries to benefit from appropriate trade policies and self reliance strategies. The progressive implementation of the Uruguay Round as a whole will generate increasing opportunities for trade expansion and economic growth to the benefit of all participants" (para. 37).
15. Commitment 4 thus expresses the belief that the Uruguay Round will lead to economic growth to allow all countries to become "self-reliant" for a critical margin of food security through dependence on imports. Case study evidence shows that "the AoA has led to a surge of food imports into the sixteen countries [in FAO case studies of 16 WTO members] but not to an increase in their exports"³⁹ has been cited in developing country proposals to implement, clarify or negotiate new provisions to the AoA. A very brief review of trade liberalization impacts on food security can offer some insight into the trade policy barriers to food security that the postponed WFS:fyl must overcome to reduce the numbers of the hungry by 2015.
16. Most of the case studies on the impact of trade liberalization in 39 countries summarized by John Madeley discuss how the dumping of agricultural commodities dumped at below the cost of production is "putting farmers in developing countries out of business."⁴⁰ Although in theory "cheap" food benefits developing country consumers, since many of those consumers are farm families driven from the land by dumped goods, the benefit is often only theoretical. Combining country study figures of rural employment lost as a result of agricultural trade liberalization, Madeley suggests that "[w]orldwide it would not be unreasonable to estimate a figure of at least 30 million jobs lost in developing countries."⁴¹ Though Madeley suggests that more research is needed to get a better understanding of the employment, migration and other impacts of agricultural trade liberalization, he notes that the WTO itself, while rejecting developing country proposals based on country specific studies, has done no such impact studies itself.⁴² The reorganization of the WTO Secretariat that will end an autonomous development studies unit is regarded with dismay by developing country delegations in Geneva. They believe the reorganization signifies a decision to continue the negotiating process regardless of demonstrable negative impacts of the present WTO agreements on developing countries.⁴³
17. The studies reviewed by Madeley deal with a comprehensive framework of analytic factors that contribute to food sovereignty. These factors include the effect of landlessness on food insecurity; the impact of structural adjustment and trade liberalization on the women who produce most of the basic foods in many developing countries; and the environmental impacts of export crop production after producers are induced to abandon traditional crops and ecologically sound traditional agricultural practices. In a conclusion from a study from Zimbabwe that could represent the conclusion of many of the case studies, an NGO concludes, "[I]t is therefore important that international trade and economic policies (e.g. SAPs [Structural Adjustment Programs] and AoA) and their impact on poverty are effectively assessed on a case by case basis before more wide-ranging ones are implemented."⁴⁴ The refusal to assess before negotiating new measures of trade liberalization would lead one to think that there is consensus about the impact of trade liberalization on food security. Have analysts of such impacts overlooked some crucial evidence of benefits from the developed countries that advocated the AoA?
18. In the case of the United States, the claim that U.S. farmers would export their way to prosperity under the AoA has been so discredited that even former proponents of agricultural trade liberalization are doubting the strategy. For example, in response to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Secretary Ann Veneman’s praise of trade as the solution to the now 50-year old profit crisis on most U.S. farms,⁴⁵ former USDA chief economist Willard Cochrane wrote, "it does not make sense to pursue a strategy of pushing exports when global demand is weak."⁴⁶ Nor does it make sense to push exports when supply among U.S. export competitors is strong, as it is now and is likely to be in the foreseeable future.⁴⁷ As a result of policies to encourage massive surplus production for export regardless of market demand, between the 1996 passage of U.S. farm legislation that went "beyond" WTO commitments and 2000, U.S. farmgate prices paid by agribusiness for corn dropped 33%; for wheat 42%; for soybeans 34% and for rice 42%.⁴⁸ Record low prices, together with record high U.S. per acre subsidies to certain program crops ⁴⁹ and the lavishing of export credits on U.S.-based exporters, led Mexico to note in a submission to the WTO that "[the] market distortions caused by the subsidies have resulted in artificially low international prices, to the detriment of producers’ profitability."⁵⁰ Without a record US$28 billion in taxpayer support, in the fiscal year ending in September 2000,⁵¹ the devastation to U.S. farmers and rural communities resulting from the price collapse would have been perhaps as severe as the price collapse in developing countries that have complied with AoA rules and agriculture structural adjustment. In response to the failure of the "WTO plus" agricultural legislation to achieve its purported intention of reducing support payments to farmers, U.S. trade officials in Geneva are desperately seeking new exemptions and definitions to allow future subsidies to be considered not "trade distorting".⁵²
19. U.S. negotiators have been reluctant to assess the causes of the failure of the AoA to deliver on the promise of prosperity for farmers (beyond the usual scapegoating of "unfair trading partners"). However other negotiators have sought to assess impacts in an effort to mitigate the negative impacts of agricultural trade liberalization. Developing country proposals to the WTO Committee on Agriculture for the Doha Ministerial have incorporated research from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),⁵³ United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)⁵⁴ and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). They note that WTO disciplines have failed to decrease dumping of below cost-of-production commodities by transnational agribusiness, which is driving national producers out of business. The increase in export subsidies and credits documented by the OECD undermines the WFS 4.2c) Objective to [R]educe subsidies on food exports in conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreement in the context of the ongoing process of reform of agriculture conducted in the WTO."
20. Neither have promised opportunities for increased agricultural exports resulted in increased export revenues, as anticipated in WFS Commitment 4. From 1995 to 1999, the United States and the European Union between them used the AoA Special Safeguard provision 399 times to protect their commodity sectors that are "sensitive" to imports.⁵⁵ The tariffication barriers that have resulted in decreased exports from LDCs could be considered a non-fulfillment of WFS Objective 4.2f) to "[R]efrain from using export restrictions in accordance with Article 12 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture," and non-product support for crops designated for food security should be allowed to exceed existing de minimis levels of support.⁵⁶
21. However, very few provisions of the food security oriented proposals were included in the WTO Secretariat’s list of implementation issues ⁵⁷ adopted by governments nor have they been addressed in WTO General Council meetings. Many of these proposals have been characterized as subjects for new negotiations, requiring new concessions by developing countries on new issues of interest to developed countries, such as ensuring a "level playing field" for transnational corporations with smaller national firms, guaranteeing investor "rights" and prohibiting governments from favoring national companies over transnational ones when those governments procurement goods and services.⁵⁸ According to the Pakistan Ambassador Munir Akram, because it seemed likely that only three of the implementation issues would be addressed at the WTO Ministerial in Doha, Qatar "we find it difficult to continue considering proposals to enlarge the negotiating agenda before, at or after Doha."⁵⁹ In view of the present WTO paralysis on so-called "non-trade concerns," including food security, NGOs/CSOs have debated different strategies outside the WTO framework to enhance food sovereignty. Yet since many of the policies that inhibit food sovereignty are legitimated by WTO rules, some of these same NGOs/CSOs have also advocated a policy strategy inside the WTO framework, to complement the larger strategy.

22. There seems to be no political will among major exporting countries to make significant derogations from trade rules for the sake of food security, much less to make food security the primary purpose of the AoA. Nor does the gross underfunding of FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security, presently two percent of the regular FAO budget,⁶⁰ give great hope for making alleviation of food insecurity a public policy priority. Those who doubt whether it is good strategy to divert a good human and financial resources from supporting local food sovereignty initiatives to advocate multilateral policies for food sovereignty have good grounds for their skepticism. Yet as governments justify their policies in terms of meeting multilateral "trade" agreement commitments, to ignore the possibility of obtaining strategic leverage by acting inside or outside such agreements does not seem prudent.
23. We will outline six policies that NGOs/CSOs may wish to consider debating in the preparations for the June 2002 Food Summit: 1) implementing the Marrakesh Decision on means to alleviate the negative affects of the AoA for Least Developed and Net Food Importing Developing Countries, as called for in the WFS Commitments; 2) regional basic commodity reserves; 3) a global food security convention outside a WTO framework; 4) WTO disciplines to phase out agricultural dumping; 5) policies grouped in an AoA "Development Box"; and 6) a formalized and annual NGO report to monitor government programs to realize WFS objectives and implement the WFS Plan of Action. These means are not mutually exclusive but each would require a considerable investment of resources to have some possibility of success, hence NGOs/CSOs will need to prioritize these policy initiatives and/or others in the Food Summit process for decision making.
24. Marrakesh Decision: One of the clearest failures to fulfill WFS commitments is the non-implementation of the Marrakesh Decision: "The Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries [NIFDCs], Marrakesh 1994, shall be fully implemented" (para. 38). The WFS call for implementation of the Decision was prompted in part by response to FAO research showing that about 14 percent of a $10 billion jump in the total LDC and IFDC food import bill in 1995 was due to UR measures.⁶¹ However, the International Monetary Fund published a paper in December 1995 that contended the recent "food price spikes" were "unrelated to the Round," hence there was no reason to implement the Marrakesh Decision.⁶² The WTO Committee on Agriculture apparently was more convinced by the agricultural experts at the IMF than by the FAO economists and decided not to implement the Decision, one provision of which calls for an international financial institution facility to compensate LIFDCS for sharp increases in food import bills. However, as a paper tabled in preparation for the WTO Ministerial in Seattle noted of the Decision, "[T]his was a significant component of the agricultural negotiations during the Uruguay Round. Many developing countries fearful of sharp rises in their food import bills agreed to the AoA because they felt the Marrakesh Decision would address, at least to some extent, the problems they would face in the implementation of the AoA. However, there has been no political will on the part of the developed countries to activate this Decision, even in the face of significantly higher import bills for NFIDCS."⁶³ This proposal, like all nearly developing country proposals for the Seattle Ministerial, was ignored by major agricultural exporting WTO members.
25. Since the first repudiation of the WFS commitment to implement the Marrakesh Decision, the systemic stakes of the Decision have grown, to the extent that the number of NFIDCS has increased and admission of the need to implement the Decision would require major agricultural exporter recognition of negative AoA impacts. FAO’s analysts have suggested that implementation of the Decision will "encourage countries to liberalize further their food markets."⁶⁴ Few NGOs/CSOs are likely to agree with the position that implementation of the Decision should depend on concessions to further liberalization. However, they may wish to consider supporting FAO’s proposal for modifying the Decision’s Compensatory Financing Facility, currently under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund, and putting it under the authority of the WTO Committee on Agriculture. This proposal would have the virtue of making the AoA more accountable for the consequences of its effects.⁶⁵
26. Food Reserves: Of possible multilateral means to enhance food security, the one that claims most immediate attention has to do with how to supply food in the event of emergencies caused by war, natural catastrophes, major crop failures and/or public health crises. At the U.S. Forum for the WFS, Refugees International, a U.S. based NGO, pointed out that although United Nations agencies and many non-governmental organizations did excellent work to supply food during emergencies, "[e]ach emergency requires a never-ceasing and time-wasting round of debate, pious resolutions and appeals for contributions, all of which hinder, delay and interrupt the most effective international response."⁶⁶ Noting the increase in refugees and displaced people worldwide, Refugees International tabled a proposal to create a "Global Food Reserve for humanitarian emergencies," to avoid the current practice of dealing with emergencies on a case by case basis. This proposal was not incorporated into the U.S. Position Paper for the WFS.⁶⁷ The WFS delegates preferred, in Objective 5c), to "[P]ursue at local and national levels, as appropriate, adequate and cost-effective strategic emergency food security reserve policies and programmes."⁶⁸ A preference for food security reserves at several levels of governance was alluded to in the WFS NGO Consultation for Africa: "a system of contingency grain banks should be restored with the support of governments and NGOs."⁶⁹
27. Towards meeting food security requirements that might not fall under the category of a "humanitarian emergency," and would not be limited to local or national programs, the Regional NGO Consultation for Europe for WFS proposed that "FAO urgently commission a technical paper, in time for the September Council of [the] World Food Security [Committee], including a rigorous study of food reserves and ‘intervention’ stocks. We need to know who holds them, who manages them, which producers have access to them and therefore what role will they play in future continental and global food security?"⁷⁰ The call for this study was endorsed by a NGO network at the U.S.-Canadian Forum for the WFS, which welcomed the U.S. government willingness "to explore with the international community systems for maintaining and improving reserves."⁷¹ To our knowledge, the FAO World Food Security Committee never commissioned such a study, which would be a necessary first step towards the creation and management of national and regional food reserves called for NGO consultation for Asia and the Pacific for the WFS.⁷² One advantage to establishing such reserves is that they would provide a food security back-up while diminishing the possibility that food aid might be used to avoid WTO subsidy disciplines, a charge that the European Union has leveled against the United States.⁷³
28. Should NGOs at WFS+6 call for preparations for the establishment of global or regional food reserves, whether for humanitarian emergencies or for more general food security needs? Considerable difficulties would arise in implementing such a proposal, in addition to the technical and financial problems of acquiring and administering such reserves. Not the least of these difficulties is the controversy over whether such food reserves would have the discretion to exclude genetically modified organisms. Within the last year, several food aid recipient countries have expressed concern that donor countries were dumping GMOs as food aid without prior informed consent and thus possibly endangering developing country centers of biodiversity, in regions where food and feed uses of grain are not often segregated.⁷⁴ While a fully implemented Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety might help prevent uninformed importing of GMOs, such implementation is still several years away, if, indeed, it can be made effective.
29. Food Sovereignty Convention: As difficult as it would be to negotiate and finance a multilateral agreement to create global or regional food security reserves, the problems associated with the negotiation and implementation of a Global Food Security Convention, called for by the NGO Forum at the WFS,⁷⁵ might be even greater. Since the Convention was called for by more than 1,200 organizations from 80 countries at WFS, the draft proposal for a convention in Rome was revised through an electronic consultation process for a Sustainable Food Security Convention. The revised proposal states that "The Food and Agriculture Organization should convene a process involving the General Assembly of the United Nations in negotiations for a Sustainable Food Security Convention. The intent of the Sustainable Food Security Convention is to elevate food security to the highest level of priority within international food policy." The Convention could exempt staples essential to domestic food security "from WTO rules and disciplines when said rules undermine national food security plans." The Convention would "coordinate the creation and management of an international network of local, national and regional food reserves. The Convention would also provide for an independent grain auditing system."⁷⁶
30. Subsequently, calls for a "World Convention on Food Sovereignty and Trade"⁷⁷ or an "International Convention on Food Sovereignty and Nutritional Well-Being"⁷⁸ have been made in the context of a policy matrix to take "the WTO out of agriculture." Though advocates of food sovereignty conventions have not yet elaborated detailed proposals for negotiations, the comprehensive nature of food sovereignty platforms suggests that a food sovereignty negotiations proposal would be similarly comprehensive. However, the resistance to such negotiations might exceed that to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, so that the compromises required to negotiate a Convention may dilute its provisions to the point of inefficacy. The interests of governments in using agricultural export revenues to pay international creditors, the financial interests of international trading countries with minimum market access guaranteed by the AoA and the interests of governments to use food as part of their diplomatic arsenals would all be affected by the realization of such a Convention.
31. The opportunity costs of dedicating resources towards such an undertaking would mean dedicating personnel and money to a task that could take years and still not result in implementation of WFS commitments. The research and diplomatic resources of non-governmental organizations and developing country governments are already at great disadvantage to the plethora of industry lobbyists and government officials protecting the interests of transnational corporations. Nonetheless, NGOs in the preparatory process for the WFS+6 may wish to discuss the viability of Convention preparations and negotiations as a way of promoting those WFS commitments with which they agree and for which they are working. Indeed, preparing for such a Convention might serve to counteract those governments that have resisted participation in the follow-up process indicated in WFS Commitment 7.
32. Phasing out agricultural dumping: Can the WTO contribute to food sovereignty by phasing out the dumping of agricultural commodities? "Considering that systematic underselling is one of the most obvious violations of free trade principles, it is puzzling that the GATT/WTO has never seriously tried to deal with dumping in agricultural trade. ... The general anti-dumping clause of the GATT is however a weak one, primarily because the operative definition of dumping is export sales at a price below the "normal price" on the domestic market. Whether or not this domestic price correctly reflects actual cost of production is not considered."⁷⁹ This lack of consideration has enabled an escalation of the use of export subsidies, export credits and other means to facilitate dumping under the AoA. Currently deadlocked WTO and OECD debates over which subsidies and credits are trade "distorting" could result in a "gentlemen’s agreement" to allow the current escalation and negotiating impasse to continue, with the effect of enabling mutually agreed upon dumping. Jacques Bertholet has shown that the European Union and United States cheat massively on their notifications of Aggregate Measures of Support, further assisting the dumping process.⁸⁰ The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) estimates, for example, that in 1998 about 30 percent of the per bushel U.S. export price of wheat was export dumping below its full cost; similarly dumped is about 20 percent of the corn price, about 30 percent of the cotton price.⁸¹
33. Because prices of agricultural goods in domestic markets are too distorted by government subsidies, credit, tax incentives and loopholes and other interventions to use a "normal price" as a baseline for determining the degree of dumping, IATP has argued that "agricultural dumping by the United States should be determined by comparing the export price to the United States’ full cost of production."⁸² This "full cost" would include the price paid by the farmer to produce the commodity according to U.S. Department of Agriculture figures, plus the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) paid by the government, as calculated by the OECD, plus the cost of transportation. This "full cost" formula does not capture such costs as those of research and development, and for inspection, but it is a formula based on agreed methodology, hence making its adoption more feasible. If the export price were below the full cost price, then the export would be subject to countervailing duties in an amount equal to the level of dumping."⁸³ In order for this methodology or a similar methodology to be adopted by major exporting countries, in those countries it will be necessary to "secure legislation that ensures export prices capture the full cost of production, including the cost of marketing and a reasonable profit."⁸⁴ Though it could take several years for all WTO members to develop reliable cost of production, PSE and transportation cost reporting, a majority of dumping could be disciplined if WTO members were required to notify export commodity specific cost of production figures. A corollary anti-dumping tool would be to link the implementation of an Effective Agricultural Safeguard Provision to the PSE calculation.
34. A "Development Box" in the AoA: The lack of opportunities and benefits promised by AoA advocates has lead developing countries to propose ways to implement the WTO agreements that would "rebalance" the benefits among WTO members. Some of the papers tabled by developing countries on implementation issues and the "built-in agenda" under Article 20 of the AoA have sought the means to optimize the opportunities for their countries to become as self-sufficient as possible in the production of basic foodstuffs. These proposals have also sought the means to increase export revenues through agricultural exports. As the most comprehensive "Development Box" non-paper stated, in view of FAO’s work on agricultural development and food security, "S[pecial] and D[ifferential] provisions and policy flexibility must therefore be provided to increase the domestic capacity in the production of food in developing countries."⁸⁵ Features of these developing country and NGO proposals include disciplines against the manipulation of tariffication to keep out developing country exports, especially higher value processed commodities; exemption for developing countries from market access requirements to protect their basic food security crop production; a revision of the AoA Special Safeguard to use against import surges in food security crops; prohibition of agricultural dumping; and provisions to allow product and non-product support for designated food security crops to exceed existing de minimis levels of support.⁸⁶
35. What is common to and most fundamental in these proposed S and D provisions is the recognition that "Special and Differential treatment provisions are to be looked at not as exceptions to the general rules but more importantly as an integral and inherent objective of the multilateral trading system."⁸⁷ Explicit in this interpretation of the S and D framework is that its provisions are not charitable and temporary exemptions from trade rules, but necessary tools in the development of a multilateral trade system that can meet the objectives set forth in the non-binding preambles of the WTO agreements. Government analysts of S and D in the multilateral trading system since the Havana Charter have concluded that "[t]he concept of S & D underwent a dramatic transformation in the Uruguay Round Agreements. The S & D treatment prior to WTO was in recognition of the special problems of development faced by developing countries, but in the WTO agreement it only recognized the special problems that developing countries may face in the implementation of the agreements [emphasis in the original]."⁸⁸ As a consequence of this counter-revolution in the understanding of the purpose of S and D provisions, "developing countries could hardly benefit from the almost 145 S&D provisions (in the Uruguay Round Agreements) which mostly do not go beyond a best endeavour promise and therefore are not legally enforceable."⁸⁹ The "Development Box" advocates’ proposal to the Doha Ministerial for a framework agreement on binding S and D provisions was ignored with many other proposals, although in December the Committee on Agriculture agreed to put the Development Box on the agenda for its meeting in February. Nonetheless, efforts will continue to press for this wide-ranging framework agreement, as well as for the AoA specific provisions of the "Development Box."
36. Monitoring Government and Intergovernmental Follow-up to the WFS Commitments and Plan of Action: Even though NGO/CSO monitoring of WFS follow-up may be the easiest policy proposal to implement, it will not be easy to finance nor to carry out. Governments will be understandably reluctant to fund NGO/CSO monitoring of WFS commitments and foundations are often reluctant to fund ongoing processes. However, the success of Social Watch in monitoring the follow-up to government commitments to the World Summit on Social Development encouraged NGOs to seek funding for a Food Watch. Social Watch combines analysis of multilateral institutions affecting social development, together with dozens of country specific reports on the state of social development programs both private and public. The failure of governments to make significant progress on the WFS objective of reducing the number of undernourished people by 400 million by 2015 has made the necessity of country-by-country monitoring more evident. Because the policy matrix of food sovereignty includes the right to food, the results of Food Watch could be reported to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights whose Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food issued his first report (E/CN.4/2001/53) in 2001. The Special Rapporteur has proposed training courses on the right to food for national representatives to the InterParliamentary Union.⁹⁰ NGOs/CSOs could propose to include an annual edition of Food Watch as part of the training course materials and request a meeting on food sovereignty with those course participants. Food Watch reports on agricultural production, access to resources and other WFS issues could be used by NGOs/CSOs to lobby their governments in preparations for intergovernmental meetings on agricultural and food security issues.
37. It is hoped that the six proposals outlined here will stimulate discussion of and commitment to work toward achieving food sovereignty.

1 | "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and health life." World Summit Food Plan of Action, para. 1 (13 November, 1996) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm/

2 | "Profit For Few Or Food For All: Food, Sovereignty, and Security to Eliminate the Globalisation of Hunger," A Statement by the NGO Forum to the World Food Summit (17 November 1996).

3 | "Food Security: Preparations for the 1996 World Food Summit," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSAID-97-44 (November 1996), 28.

4 | "World Food Summit: Interpretive statements for the record by the Government of the United States of America," undated at http://ffas.usda.gov//ffas/food_summit/interpre.html/. Given the U.S. denial of an international obligation to work to implement a right to food, it is perhaps not surprising that a review of U.S. government implementation of the WFS "Plan of Action" concludes that "there has thus been no functioning governance mechanism for carrying out basic tasks that would normally be associated with implementing an action plan." Michael R. Taylor and Jody S. Tick, "Fulfilling the Promise: A Governance Analysis of the U.S. Response to the World Food Summit Goal of Cutting Hunger in Half by 2015," RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE at http://www.rtf.org/ (September 2001), 13.

5 | "End Hunger! Fight for the Right to Live!" NGOs/CSOs Statement in the Asian Regional Consultation on the World Food Summit - Five Years Later (Bangkok, Thailand; 28-29 August 2001), 4.

6 | "Final Declaration on the World Forum on Food Sovereignty" (Havana, Cuba; 7 September 2001), 5.

7 | See the NGO Forum draft papers, "The Right to Adequate Food in the Process of the World Food Summit Followup: The possible role of an International Code of Conduct on the Right to Adequate Food," "2001 Rome NGO Forum on Food Sovereignty" and "Sustaining Agricultural Biodiversity and the Free Flow of Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture."

8 | Linda Elswick and Tom Forster, "The Hunger and Agriculture Debate: A human bridge between Rome, Qatar and South Africa," UNED FORUM, Vol. II, issue vi (November 2001), 7.

9 | See, e.g. Jules Pretty, Rachel Hime and Jean Marc von der Weid, "Alternative Models (or Approaches) to Food Production," 2001 Rome NGO Forum on Food Sovereignty (3-9 November 2001).

10 | "Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box," Proposal to the June, 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador, World Trade Organization G/AG/NG/W/13; 23 June 2000.

11 | Press Statement by "Friends of the Development Box," (10 November 2001) at http://www.wtowatch.org/library/

12 | Barry Wilson, "UN Struggles to measure hunger problem," THE WESTERN PRODUCER, 15 November 2001.

13 | Ian Elliot, "Modest proposal offered for trade negotiators to consider," FEEDSTUFFS, 23 January, 2001.

14 | "Food Sovereignty and International Trade," VIA CAMPESINA (Bangalore, India: 6 October 2000) at http://rds.org.hn/via/theme-food.htm

15 | E.g. "Via Campesina demands: Take agriculture out of the WTO," Via Campesina (Tegucigalpa, Honduras; 1 December 1999); Daniel Van Der Steen et al. "L’Organization Mondiale du Commerce et l’agriculture: la souveraineté alimentaire menacée par les accords commerciaux," Collectif Stratégies Alimentaires (Brussels; November 1999); "Food Sovereignty: Malaysian NGO Position Paper on Agriculture," Education and Research Association for Consumers (Selangor, Malaysia; November 1999).

16 | "Tlaxcala Declaration of the Via Campesina," Tlaxcala, Mexico, April 1996.

17 | "End Hunger! Fight for the Right to Live!" 3.

18 | "Déclaration d’Accra sur la sécurité alimentaire en Afrique," Consultation Régionale Préparatoire des ONG/OSC de l’Afrique au Sommet Mondial de l’Alimentation: Cinq ans après," (Accra, Ghana; 8-12 octobre 2001), 3.

19 | Duncan Green and Shishir Priyadrarshi, "Proposal for a ‘Development Box’ in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture," South Centre (Geneva, June 2001), 9-13, and "Loaded against the poor," Oxfam United Kingdom (November 1999) at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ 13-16.

20 | Jacques Berthelot, "Some theoretical and factual clarifications in order to get a fair Agreement on Agriculture at the WTO," paper prepared for the "Symposium on issues confronting the world trading system," World Trade Organization (Geneva, 6-7 July 2001), 3.

21 | E.g. Ernest S. Micek, "Global agriculture: Working toward a sustainable food system, THE CARGILL BULLETIN, (Vol. 7, No. 4) December 1999, at 3.

22 | "Beyond Tariffs, Markets and Trade," Integrated Rural Development Foundation of the Philippines, January 2002.

23 | Francisco G. Pascual and Arze G. Glipo, "WTO and Philippine Agriculture," Integrated Rural Development Foundation of the Philippines (Quezon City: 12 December 2001).

24 | "Some issues relating to food security in the context of the WTO negotiations on agriculture," Discussion paper No. 1 FAO Geneva Roundtable On Food Security In The Context Of The WTO Negotiations On Agriculture (20 July 2001), 2.

25 | Ibid. Table 3, "Relative importance of agriculture in selected WTO member countries," 9.

26 | Ibid., 4.

27 | See Pekka Huhtaniemi, "Agriculture - Issues and Negotiations," Non-Governmental Organizations Symposium on issues confronting the world trading system - summary reports by the moderators," World Trade Organization (Geneva; 6 July 2001). at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/

28 | "Achieving Public Confidence in the Global Food System," International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food and Trade (Washington DC, 2001), 5-6. The paper can be ordered at http://www.ipcaft.org/

29 | Herman Daly, "Farewell Address to the World Bank," 1994.

30 | "The State of Food and Agriculture," 31^st Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization (2-13 November 2001), 11.

31 | William Greider, "Pro Patria, Pro Mundus," THE NATION (12 November 2001), 24 at http://www.thenation.com/

32 | "IPC to Meet with National Delegations at the WTO in October," AGRI-TRADE FORUM, Vol. 10, No. 1, (July 2001), 4.

33 | Peter Einarsson, "Agricultural trade policy as if food security and ecological sustainability mattered: Review and analysis of alternative proposals for the renegotiation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture," Church of Sweden Aid et al. (November 2000), 15.

34 | Ibid., 14.

35 | Ibid., 29.

36 | Jacques Morisset, "Unfair Trade? Empirical Evidence In World Commodity Markets Over the Past 25 Years," World Bank (April 1997), 36.

37 | See Sophia Murphy, "Market Power in Agricultural Markets: Some Issues for Developing Countries," T.R.A.D.E. Working Paper 6, South Centre (Geneva; November 1999). For insight into the operations of one such trading company, see Brewster Kneen, Invisible Giant: Cargill and Its Transnational Strategies (Pluto Press: London, 1995). For insight on the relations between government officials and another such company, engaged in illegal transactions, see James Lieber, Rats in the Grain: The Dirty Tricks and Trials of Archer Daniels Midland (New York City: Four Walls Eight Windows Press, 2000) at http://www.4W8W.com/.

38 | "New Enclosures: Alternative Mechanisms to Enhance Corporate Monopoly and BioSerfdom in the 21^st Century," THE ETC. GROUP, Communique #73 (November/December 2001), 17 at http://www.etcgroup.org/

39 | John Madeley, "Trade and Hunger: An Overview of Case Studies on the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Food Security," (October 2000), FORUM SYD et al at http://wwww.forumsyd.se/ 13.

40 | Ibid., 3.

41 | Ibid., 4.

42 | Ibid., 7.

43 | Chakravarthi Raghavan, "WTO Secretariat ‘Reorganizes for New Round,’" SOUTH NORTH DEVELOPMENT MONITOR EMAIL EDITION, 18 December 2001.

44 | M. Chisvo, "Trade liberalisation and household food security: a study from Zimbabwe," (CIIR, July 2000) in Madeley, "Trade and Hunger," 24.

45 | For a brief history of policies inducing crisis on U.S. farms, see Mark Ritchie, "Crisis by Design," (1987, rev. 2001) Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy at http://www.iatp.org/

46 | Willard Cochrane, "Can Exports Solve Farm Problem?" OMAHA WORLD HERALD, 17 May 2001.

47 | Daryll Ray, "The Importance of International Supply Growth," Agricultural Policy Analysis Center (13 July 2001) at http://agpolicy.org/WeeklyCols/052-07-13-01SupplySide 2.htm

48 | U.S. Department of Agriculture statistics analyzed by John Dittrich, American Corn Growers and published in "Senter on the Hill," a Washington, DC newsletter (April 2000)

49 | "USDA Providing Record Assistance To Farmers," U.S. Department of Agriculture press release (2 October 2000), and Clark Williams-Derry "Green Acre$: How Taxpayers are Subsidizing the Demise of the Family Farm," Environmental Working Group Paper (April 2000) at http://www.ewg.org/

50 | "Proposal by Mexico for the Negotiations on Agriculture in the World Trade Organization," World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture (19 March 2001), G/AG/NG/W/138. See also Alejandro Nadal, "The Environmental and Social Impacts of Economic Liberalization on Corn Production in Mexico," Oxfasm GB and World Wildlife Fund International (September 2000) at http://www.panda.org/ and Ana de Ita, "Impunidad local en el mercado global. Los maiceros entre el filo del gobierno mexicano y el libre mercado," Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association meeting (Guadalajara, Mexico; 17-19 April 1997) at http://www.ceccam.org.mx/

51 | "Freedom to Farm: An Agricultural Price Response Experiment -- What Have We Learned In Four Years?" POLICY MATTERS (May 2000) at http://apacweb.ag.utk.edu/

52 | "U.S. Seeks Redefinition of Exempt Agriculture Domestic Support," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 6 October, 2000.

53 | E.g. "The Uruguay Round Agreement in Agriculture: An Evaluation of Its Implementation in OECD Countries (Executive Summary) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 2001.

54 | E.g. "Synthesis of Country Case Studies," FAO Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security: Issues and Options in the Forthcoming WTO Negotiations From the Perspective of Developing Countries," Geneva, 23-24 September 1999.

55 | Bertholet, "Some theoretical and factual clarifications in order to get to a fair Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO," 4.

56 | Green and Priyadarshi, "Proposal for a ‘Development Box’ in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture," 14-15.

57 | "New Implementation Proposal Gains footing in Long-Stalled Debate," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 22 June 2001.

58 | "Status Report Shows Deep Divisions On Agenda For New WTO Round," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 27 July, 2001, and Chakravrthi Ragahavan, "Majors stalling on implementation issues," SOUTH-NORTH DEVELOPMENT MONITOR, email edition, 24 July 2001.

59 | Cited in Martin Khor, "Many Developing Countries Speak Against New Issues At WTO Council Meeting To Review Doha Preparations," Third World Network Information Service on WTO Issues, 31 July 2001.

60 | "Statement of the Director General," 31^st Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization Conference (November 2001), 6.

61 | "Quad Countries Silent In Face of WTO Deadlock on Implementation," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 23 March 2001.

62 | Penny Fowler, "The Marrakesh Decision: Honouring the Commitment to Net Food-Importing Developing Countries," (a Catholic Institute for International Relations report excerpted and summarized by Steve Suppan) Sustainable Food Security Fact Sheet No. 6 (September 1996), Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy.

63 | "Agriculture: Proposal under Paragraphs 9(a)(I) and 9(a)(ii) of the Geneva Ministerial Decision, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial," Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe; World Trade Organization, WT/GC/W/374 (15 October 1999), para. 5 h).

64 | "Towards Improving the Operation Effectiveness of the Marrakech Decision on the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least Developed and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries," FAO Geneva Roundtable on Selected Agricultural Trade Policy Issues (21 March 2001), 3.

65 | Ibid., 12.

66 | Larry Thompson, "Overcoming Hunger: A Proposal To Create A Global Food Reserve," Refugees International, U.S. Forum for the World Food Summit (Washington, DC; 3 June 1996).

67 | "The U.S. Contribution to World Food Security" The U.S. Position Paper Prepared for the World Food Summit," (Washington, DC; July 1996).

68 | "Report of the Regional NGO Consultation for Africa on the World Food Summit, WFS/ARC/NGO/REP United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; 14-15 April 1996), Appendix 3, 3.

69 | "Report of the Regional NGO Consultation for Africa on the World Food Summit, WFS/ARC/NGO/REP United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; 14-15 April 1996), Appendix 3, 3.

70 | "Report of the Regional NGO Consultation for Europe on the World Food Summit," WFS/ARC/NGO/REP United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (Tel Aviv, Israel; 28-29 April 1996), 4.

71 | "Statement of the Global Network on Food Security," NGO Preparatory Meetings, U.S. Canadian Forum for the World Food Summit (Lansing, Michigan: 23-24 June 1996), 3.

72 | "Report of the Regional NGO Consultation for Asia and the Pacific on the World Food Summit," WFS/ARC/NGO/REP United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (Bangkok, Thailand; 29-30 April 1996), para. 6.3v) at 6.

73 | "EU Seeks Tighter Rules on Food Aid, Export Credits in Ag Talks," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 22 September, 2000.

74 | "Letter from the Environmental Protection Authority, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the Minister of Agriculture, Republic of South Africa," 21 July 2000; "Africa Still Not As Excited As Companies Say," CROPCHOICE OPINION, 13 September 2000 at http://www.cropchoice.com/ and "South Africa After The Year 2000 Floods: Seed Initiative" at http://www.snafu.de/~usp/seed-ini.htm/

75 | "Profit for Few or Food for All," 4.

76 | "Plan of Action to Achieve Universal Food Security," revised by Karen Lehman, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 20 September 1999. Contact smurphy@iatp.org for a copy of this revision.

77 | "End Hunger! Fight for the Right to Live!" NGOs/CSOs Statement in the Asian Regional Consultation on the World Food Summit -- Five Years Later (Bangkok, Thailand; 28-29 August 2001), 3.

78 | "Final Declaration on the World Forum on Food Sovereignty" (Havana, Cuba; 7 September 2001), 5.

79 | Einarsson, "Agricultural trade policy as if food security and ecological sustainability mattered," 19-20.

80 | Bertholet, "Some theoretical and factual clarifications in order to get to a fair Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO," 5-7 and in Bertholet, L’agriculture, talon d’Achille de la mondialisation. Clés pour un Accord agricole solidaire à l’OMC, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001).

81 | Mark Ritchie, Suzanne Wisniewski and Sophia Murphy, "Dumping as a Structural Feature of U.S. Agriculture: Can WTO Rules Solve the Problem?" (April 2001), Annex 2, at http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/Dumping_as_a_Structural_Feature_of_US_Agricult.htm/

82 | Ibid., 1.

83 | Ibid., 7.

84 | Ibid., 7.

85 | "Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box," 2.

86 | Green and Priyadarshi, "Proposal for a ‘Development Box’ in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture," 14-15.

87 | "Proposal for Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment," Preparations for the [WTO] 2001 Ministerial Conference, Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe (November 2001), para. 1.

88 | Ibid., para. 7.

89 | Ibid., para. 9.

90 | "Implementation of the World Food Summit," The Ad Hoc Group of Representatives to FAO of International Non-Governmental Organisations, Annex A (June 2001), 10.

For comments on and questions about this paper, contact:
Steve Suppan, Ph.D.
Director of Research
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
Ssuppan@iatp.org