Agriculture Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack ¹

Bioterrorism is not restricted to attacks on people. Livestock and crops may also be targeted. That risk, says biologist Wouter van der Weijden, forces us to make fundamental changes to our agricultural system.

In recent months the world has become acquainted with new forms of terrorism: suicide air attacks and bioterrorism. Bioterrorism is not limited to anthrax attacks on people, and assaults with smallpox, botulism and plague have not been ruled out. A new concern is bioterrorism targeted at agriculture. In a report published early this year, the US Department of Defense lists fourteen animal diseases and seven plant diseases that are easily spread by terrorists and can cause widespread damage. An attack by foot and mouth could cause fifteen billion dollars worth of damage, and an attack with the fungal disease soybean rust as much as eight billion dollars a year. Persistent malfunctioning of the food production system could, according to the report, undermine government authority, and even US defence capacity.

Such agroterrorism is also conceivable in Europe. The Netherlands had a foretaste of the possible consequences during an outbreak of swine fever in 1977, and Britain and the Netherlands were gripped by foot and mouth last year. Millions of pigs, cows and sheep had to be destroyed and the financial losses ran into billions of euros. In England the army was called out, carcass pyres built and mass graves dug; large areas of the countryside were closed and the general election postponed. Twice as much damage could easily have been caused by bioterrorists.

What groups of people might espouse agroterrorism? First, political and religious fundamentalists who want to disrupt society. Second, militant supporters of left-wing, right-wing, ethnic or nationalist movements. Third, vindictive, intelligent loners, like the UNA bomber in America. And fourth, animal rights activists wanting to sabotage the livestock industry: those that burn meat factories and lorries may not shrink from spreading animal diseases. The activist group PETA has already threatened to release foot and mouth virus in American cattle markets.

The fact that the danger can come from many sides makes agroterrorism a risk we have to take seriously. EU Commissioner David Byrne raised this point last month with the Council of Agricultural Ministers, arguing for the swift introduction of an active EU policy on bioterrorism.

What may attract extremists to agroterrorism? First, the enormous physical and economic damage it can cause. Second, the low costs: some pathogens are cheap to buy, easy to smuggle into a country, and can be released in many places with little difficulty. Besides, the chance of being caught is small, and proof is hard to come by. And you need no suicide commandos for bioterrorism.

Is agriculture prepared for bioterrorism? Hardly. Current protection of livestock and crops against pests and diseases consists of three lines of defence: hygiene, controlling disease and improving natural resistance. The first line, hygiene, begins at the borders. Imported plants and animals are checked for disease and pests, and returned or quarantined if necessary. This line of defence has received much attention over the last decades, but it is gradually being undermined by the globalisation of trade and travel. Against the bioterrorist, it is about as effective as the Maginot Line was against Germany in 1940.

The second line of defence, in the event of an outbreak, is to tackle the disease with pesticides or medicines, including antibiotics; or destroying diseased plants and animals. But the use of pesticides and medicines is increasingly constrained by food safety and environmental regulations, while mass slaughter of animals arouses public protest.

The third line of defence is to build biological resilience into the agricultural system. This can be done in various ways, including breeding for disease resistance and vaccinating livestock. The problem with vaccination is that current trade policies vigorously discourage it. WTO regulations gives disease-free countries that have no vaccination programme the right to ban imports of livestock and meat from other countries where animals are vaccinated. This is because current tests cannot distinguish between sick and vaccinated animals. In response, an increasing number of countries are trying to eradicate disease so that they can stop their vaccination programmes, allowing them to export to more countries and permit imports from fewer countries. Thus more and more biological time bombs are created, which make easy targets for terrorists. The US Department of Defense acknowledges that America’s disease-free status for many animal diseases makes it vulnerable to bioterrorism.

All that remains are other, biological and ecological methods to strengthen the resilience of the agricultural system. These include breeding disease-resistant crop varieties and livestock breeds and breaking up monocultures. Little has been done in this sphere in the last few decades because there was little need. Now there is. Vaccination deserves to be re-evaluated too.

These methods may bring additional advantages. Resistant crops need fewer pesticides and resistant livestock breeds need fewer medicines, including antibiotics. Both food safety and the environment benefit. By vaccinating livestock we can spare ourselves the traumatic scenes of killing fields. And as monocultures make way for diversity, the landscape itself may benefit.

All this requires fundamental changes in policy. Resilience to terror deserves a place in the definition of sustainable agriculture and in the objectives of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. The EU will have to clearly identify where the greatest risks lie. Large concentrations of livestock, for example, no longer appear sustainable.

In addition, a change in trade policy seems inevitable. The heavy trade sanctions on vaccination must be abolished, at least in those cases where the importing country uses a tests which can distinguish between sick and vaccinated animals. Then the EU, the US and other countries can relax their non-vaccination policy, thereby reducing the number of biological time bombs in the world. It also seems sensible to further tighten food safety and environmental standards. This will compel the agricultural sector to use fewer pesticides and medicines, and to work harder to strengthen the biological resilience of the system. Agricultural subsidies and research grants can provide incentives. Organic agriculture, which is in the vanguard of biological resilience, also deserves support. Where necessary, we will have to make use of gene technology to build resistance into crops.

An effective strategy against terrorism is one that removes its causes while combating terrorism itself. Beyond that, we must strengthen the resilience of our production systems, including farming.

1 | An abbreviated version of this article was published in the Dutch newspaper NRC-Handelsblad on November 26^th.