It's been seven months since the discovery of a mad cow-infected
Holstein in Washington state, time enough for the administration to have
developed a comprehensive regulatory response to protect the U.S. beef
supply. Indeed, to listen to the rhetoric of Agriculture Secretary Ann
Veneman, you'd think the administration had done just that. In
particular, the administration is fond of referring to a series of
"firewalls" in place to prevent protein from infected cattle from
reaching the food supply. On closer inspection, however, it turns out
that the administration's mad cow "firewalls" are more about public
relations than food safety, and that instead of protecting the
beef-eating public, the administration seems more focused on protecting
the beef industry's profits.
Veneman announced the discovery of the first U.S. case of mad cow on
Dec. 23, 2003. Almost in the same breath, she declared that any risk to
public health in the United States was "extremely low." Officials
predicted that mad cow would not spread to other animals because of
regulatory "firewalls" USDA and the Food and Drug Administration had
previously erected. In fact, Veneman boasted, she planned to eat beef
for Christmas. A few days later, USDA and FDA both announced their
intention to strengthen and supplement existing protections.
An investigation by the Center for Progressive Regulation (CPR) has
concluded, however, that the administration's actions don't match its
rhetoric. The much ballyhooed "firewalls" are so poorly conceived and
implemented that they provide far less protection than the American
consumer expects and deserves. In particular, a critical loophole in the
regulations permits slaughterhouses to get away with doing no testing
whatsoever for mad cow contamination in edible meat.
The government initially erected three "firewalls": controls barring
U.S. companies from importing cattle and feed from countries
experiencing mad cow outbreaks; a surveillance program to identify
suspect cattle and conduct tests on a small number of them; and
restrictions on the kinds of protein that can be included in cattle feed.
After the discovery of the infected Holstein, officials announced two
additional "firewalls" aimed specifically at protecting human health: a
ban on the use of "downer" (unable to walk) cattle in human food; and a
regulatory program to ensure that highly infective "specified risk
materials," including brains, spinal cords and small intestines, do not
contaminate edible meat. Unfortunately, none of these "firewalls"
provide the precautionary protections implied in the "firewall" metaphor
and demanded by the meat safety laws.
USDA shredded its own restrictions on imports when it covertly permitted
U.S. meatpackers to import 33 million pounds of beef from Canada between
September 2003 and May 2004 despite Veneman's August 2003 announcement
that she was extending a ban on such meat. And while USDA has expanded
its surveillance firewall, the number of cattle tested for mad cow
disease in the United States is still pitifully small. Indeed, the
program remains entirely voluntary. USDA has adamantly rejected any sort
of universal approach for testing all cattle, and even refused to let
one company conduct universal testing on its own nickel!
FDA promised in January to enhance its feed restriction firewall by
eliminating some questionable exemptions, but in the face of resistance
from the rendering and poultry industries, it has reneged on that promise.
Most troublesome of all is an obscure, but gaping loophole in the
firewall governing the handling of "specified risk materials" (SRMs)
from slaughtered cattle. The regulation permits industry to elect not to
implement rigorous standards for specific controls, simply by asserting
as almost all establishments apparently have that mad cow disease is
unlikely to be a problem in their facility. After reaching that
conclusion on their own, companies are allowed to follow far less
rigorous, industry-drafted Standard Operation Procedures to keep SRM out
of edible meat. They are required to have a written plan, but not to
follow it. Neither are they required to check for mad cow, or to perform
simple tests for brain and other risky nervous system tissues in edible
meat. Not surprisingly, it appears that most of the beef industry has
taken this less burdensome path. As a result, the administration's
assurances about safeguards and firewalls, at least with respect to U.S.
beef processing plants, amount to little more than rhetoric.
The sad truth is that the firewalls are designed more to protect the
meat industry from economic loss than to protect Americans from mad cow.
The consequence: American consumers are at an unnecessarily greater risk
of contracting a debilitating and always fatal disease.
Thomas O. McGarity, an expert in food safety law, is a professor of law
at the University of Texas and president of the Center for Progressive
Regulation.American Progress
