But wait. On the far side of the world there are some things that the Bush administration may be getting right. America's Iraq policies are no less unpopular in the Far East and South Asia, but "for a variety of reasons - strategic interests, growing relative economic importance, qualified personnel in government, and a lack of domestic political complications - we have a more stable and successful foreign policy in Asia," says Nicholas Platt, president of the Asia Society and an old Far East hand who served as a diplomat in five Asian countries.
Take China. The Bush team came in with a "neocon chip on its shoulder," saying that Clinton had gotten it all wrong. China wasn't going to be a strategic partner; it was a rival and a threat. The administration seemed intent on making China an enemy. Early in the administration an incident over an American spy plane threatened a major rupture between the two countries. Colin Powell, the new secretary of state, however, handled the crisis skillfully, and a major break was averted.
Then came 9/11, and the antagonism toward China that the Bush administration had brought with it into office was suddenly muted. The United States needed China, and China, determined not to let bad relations with the United States interfere with its rapid economic development, moved quickly to be supportive of the new war against terror. China did not threaten to use its veto in the UN to thwart the United States, and despite a few hiccups over trade matters and human rights, Beijing and Washington today are acting very much like, well, strategic partners. President Bush's strong rebuke of Taiwan's flirt with independence went against the traditional Republican tendency to favor Taipei over Beijing - a sign of the new times.
United States policy toward North Korea, however, fell into the pit that has affected so much of America's relations abroad: the split between the professional, problem-solving diplomats and the new-right radical ideologues. Whenever the United States would get ready to talk to the North Koreans the hard-liners, specifically Vice President Cheney, would get involved to prevent dialogue. But that being said, the policy of bringing all of North Korea's neighbors - Russia, Japan, South Korea, and, most important, China - into the effort to restrain North Korea was a good idea. Whether it will work or not still remains to be seen, but the approach was a model of multilaterialism and cooperation.
As for the second-most-populous country in the world, India represents one of the few places where the incoming Bush administration did not follow its "ABC" (anything but Clinton) rule. Bush continued with the opening Clinton had made, perhaps at first seeing India as a counterweight to China. Just before 9/11 the administration announced that it was seeking a strategic partnership with India. Since then the United States has pushed forward with its new friendship with India, reversing decades of Cold War suspicion - a move of the highest strategic importance. And the Bush administration has done so without threatening China.
As for Pakistan, one of the Bush administration's diplomatic triumphs was getting President Pervez Musharraf to reverse his country's policy toward the Taliban in Afghanistan. America's good relationships with both Pakistan and India are helping to bringing what is perhaps the most dangerous nuclear confrontation in the world closer to a peaceful resolution as the two sides discuss a settlement in Kashmir.
Why has the United States handled relations with China and India more skillfully than it has with Europe and the Middle East? "There are few areas of our Asia policy that have strong constituencies in domestic American politics," Platt says, "nothing compared to the clout of the American Israel Political Action Committee, which can directly hurt the reelection chances" of all who oppose their polices, nor anything approaching the political power of Cuban-Americans. Perhaps another reason the Bush administration is faring better in Asia is that on the whole, policy has been left more to the State Department and the professionals and except for North Korea has been less affected by the Pentagon ideologues who have brought about the militarization of so much of American foreign policy.Boston Globe:
