New York Times | January 3, 2002 | By ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER
The narrow House vote last month to extend trade promotion authority to the president may be a hollow victory for proponents of free trade. When the blush of success wears off, they may well realize that this battle, won on a 215-214 vote, has significantly weakened the chances of Republicans - traditionally the champions of free trade - to maintain control of the House of Representatives. And only to enact a measure that is of little practical value.
The Bush administration and the House leadership badly wanted the president to have the authority that this measure would give him: power to negotiate trade agreements that Congress must vote to approve or disapprove without amending them. To win the vote, the Republican leaders used various enticements, but in the end it came down to old-fashioned arm twisting, a sudden surge of three votes by wavering Republicans and a strike of the gavel before opponents had time to react.
Given repeated polls showing that Americans believe, rightly or wrongly, that trade agreements cost jobs, this measure is likely to be a major election issue in 2002. And with the Republican majority in the House razor-thin, this vote could have a major impact.
Robin Hayes and Cass Ballenger, for example, are both Republicans from highly competitive districts in North Carolina. Their districts have many voters who work in textiles - an industry in which much production has shifted to plants and manufacturers outside the United States. Both vowed to vote no and changed their minds under White House pressure. Their votes are sure to be used against them by Democratic opponents.
Republicans whose seats may become less secure because of redistricting - including several in New York, North Carolina, Iowa, Oklahoma and Georgia - could find their votes in favor of trade promotion authority extremely damaging. And in states like Kentucky, Florida and Pennsylvania that have been hard-hit by trade-related job losses, Republican incumbents may find that a vote in favor of fast-track trade authority does not mix well with a slowing domestic economy.
No fewer than 28 Republicans who opposed fast-track in 1998 switched their votes last month. Thirty Republicans who received less than 55 percent of the vote in their 2000 contests voted in favor. Three Republican opponents of fast-track simply sat out the vote, a position sure to annoy constituents on what is seen as a critical measure.
And the fight is not over. The Senate will almost certainly make changes to the trade bill, and a new version drafted in a conference committee is likely to go before the House in the midst of the Congressional election campaign. Not only will this be another excruciating vote for House Republicans, but the measure could easily lose its one-vote majority the next time around.
Republicans should be asking themselves whether passing fast-track this winter, in this way, was worth the risk of losing the House.
There is good reason to doubt that trade promotion authority, which is simply a procedural tool, is even necessary. It is far more significant in the Senate than in the House, since House leaders, unlike their Senate counterparts, already enjoy enormous power to limit amendments and compel votes under normal floor procedures. And given the overwhelming support for free trade measures in the Senate, there is little need there for special procedures.
The conventional wisdom about the importance of fast-track trade negotiating was shown to be flawed last year, when Congress not only passed a significant and controversial trade bill liberalizing textile tariffs, but also enacted permanent normal trade relations with China - both in an election year and without fast-track.
Even to the extent one considers fast-track essential, Republicans would not have paid such a high political price in December if they had not alienated Democrats in the past, throwing up obstacles when it was Bill Clinton who wanted this authority.
Even if the consequences of last month's vote do not alter the results of the elections in November, the trade consensus that has predominated in Congress for much of the last five decades continues to erode. Indeed, we may be seeing that consensus go from fragile to totally broken before our very eyes.
Robert E. Lighthizer, a trade lawyer, was a deputy trade representative in the Reagan administration.
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