THE UNITED Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which has just wound up its 11th conference in Sao Paolo, Brazil, has completed four decades of its existence. It has undergone a metamorphosis since the 1990s and old UNCTAD veterans may find it difficult to recognise what remains.
When UNCTAD came into existence it responded to a conjuncture in history that was unique. It stood at the mid-point of the "Short Twentieth Century", which had already gone through the trauma of the two imperialist-capitalist wars and the Great Depression in between. It had also witnessed the birth of two revolutions that had fundamentally challenged and altered the course of the capitalist expansion of the preceding century. The new conjuncture has been variously described as "the golden age of capitalism" or "the taming of capitalism" or "the compromise that was forced on the capitalist order by the emergence of an alternative system engendered by the two revolutions" or " the age of decolonisation and the emergence of a whole new world of nation-states across the two continents."
One thing was clear. The conjuncture generated a hope (and perhaps, carried within itself a possibility) of harnessing the global economic processes towards a new world order, the very anti-thesis of the preceding century.
UNCTAD neatly articulated this hope. It reflected, more than any other post-Second World War multilateral institution, the new collocation of forces that had emerged.
In the colonial era, trade was the instrument of exploitation. In UNCTAD's charter, trade was looked upon as the very means of "development" of the victims of colonialism and neo-colonialism. It recognised the crucial role of the new regimes brought about by the two revolutions. It recognised the need for, and the strength of, collective bargaining for re-ordering international economic relations. Witness the novel structure and methods of business that it introduced.
The nation-states were categorised neatly into four "Groups". Group-77 represented the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America; in other words, the constituents of the erstwhile colonial world and the victims of neo-colonialism. Group "B" constituted the developed world, comprising the leading capitalist countries of the 20th century, the erstwhile colonial and imperial masters, and also the latecomers into the world of the rich such as Japan, Norway, and Switzerland. Group "D" consisted of the home of the Socialist Revolution of the century and its periphery. Lastly there was the product of the second Socialist Revolution, China, by itself constituting the fourth Group.
The contradictions inherent in the conjuncture were not sought to be wished away in false rhetoric of "a harmonious free world"; rather they were explicitly recognised. The dialectical potential for transformation was also recognised. So, the negotiations were carried on between the Groups, the constituents having arrived at a common group position first. This technique was premised on the recognition of the patent conflict of interest between G-77 and Group B. Equally, the historical contribution of the Socialist countries in providing a concrete alternative to the capitalist order, in catalysing the unwinding of colonialism and in wresting a major accommodation in favour of the working classes everywhere, was recognised. These countries were playing a strategic role. They were strengthening developing countries' national strategies of development. They were also playing a balancing and supportive role to G-77 in the negotiations for transformation of the world order.
Neither the structure of UNCTAD nor its negotiating methodology was a product of the fanciful imagination of international bureaucrats or the wishful thinking of naive reformers. Both the elements only reflected the historical conjuncture then prevailing. Furthermore, they sought to capture the possibility, howsoever slight, of harnessing the global economic processes - the most potent one of trade - for the transformation of international economic relations.
It goes to the credit of UNCTAD of the 1960-70s that it attempted to perceive and reflect the historical conjuncture, with its inherent contradictions and possibilities, as closely as possible. It tried honestly to realise the hope, if not the possibility, of transformation. This can hardly be said of other multilateral institutions of the post-Second World War era.
It is not necessary here to go through the various UNCTAD initiatives of the 1960-70s or the reverse process to foil those initiatives and worse that followed in the 1980-90s. The net result is before us today: an UNCTAD that is not even a faint shadow of what it was in the 1960-70s.
The present conjuncture is vastly different from the one prevailing in the 1960s. The space available to national development strategies has been substantially narrowed down, if not eliminated altogether. The scope for pursuing expansionary macro-economic policies at the national level has been circumscribed severely as a result of the ascendancy of global finance capital. The capitalist world order is passing through a long drawn recessionary phase. The countervailing force of the Socialist countries is no longer there. The global capital in crisis is becoming more and more predatory. The latest events have shown the re-emergence of its militarist tendencies. The developing world is under tremendous pressure to "integrate" with the capitalist world; that is to say, provide further scope for the aggrandisement of global capital. UNCTAD of the late 1980s and the 1990s virtually converted itself into a minor research organisation supportive of the onslaught of global capital.
This plight of UNCTAD has produced two reactions, one more cautious than the other. First, it is argued that the best UNCTAD can now do is to provide some "correcting" inputs to developing countries - strengthening their capabilities for negotiations in forums such as the World Trade Organisation, and generally bring out a cautious critique of happenings in trade and development without hurting the sensibilities of global capital or challenging its main thesis. It is virtually a counsel of defeatism, if not crass collaborationism.
The other reaction is inspired by the unique historical role of UNCTAD in the first two decades of its existence. In this view, UNCTAD should recapture its glory by renewing its championship of developing countries. It should enter the trade negotiations through the backdoor, that is to say by influencing the position of developing countries, put forward the thesis of "special and differential treatment" in their favour, and generally help developing countries integrate on less unequal terms.
There is no fundamental difference of approach in the two in that both accept the destiny of "integration" with the capitalist order. In other words, they lack in historicity. For them it is, in a sense, the end of history already. No wonder that these tendencies are blind to the contradictions building up within the system and to the possibilities of transformation nurtured within the contradictions. The second tendency poses to be radical in talking about recapturing lost glory. But it is as unhistorical as the first because recalling past glory is not historicity. It amounts to romanticism. The first tendency, on the other hand, amounts to unashamed collaborationism.
The merit of the UNCTAD of the first two decades of its existence was that it had a sense of history, that it perceived the inherent contradictions. Above all, it sought to facilitate the praxis through its analyses and negotiating initiatives. (Never mind that, in retrospect, the endeavour appears too weak or too optimistic). If we wish to reinvent the role for UNCTAD in the present times, we must relate its structure, its functioning and its objectives to history as it is being made in our times That will mean analysing the present phase in the evolution of global capitalism-imperialism. It will require an objective assessment of the emerging contradictions. Above all, it will call for a creative insight to locate and nurture the seeds of change.
The major contradiction of our times is that global capital requires a global state to secure its onslaught. Such a possibility is nowhere in sight. Hence the desperate attempts by global capital. They range from seeking to convert WTO into an instrument of global governance to the military adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Within the folds of this major contradiction are developing a series of other contradictions. The discontent with the onslaught of global capital is not confined to the Third World of the poor. It has a growing following in the metropolitan countries. The contradiction in this sense is far more universal than it was in the 1960-70s. In the Third World, it is showing signs of accumulating explosive potential. The indefatigable resistance being put forward by the Iraqis and the political churning going on in the Middle East are eloquent examples.
The threat posed by the WTO regime on agriculture to the very survival of the three billion-strong peasantry of the developing world has a no less explosive potential. The ascendancy of global capital and the acute vulnerability to which it has exposed national financial systems, particularly of the developing world, provides another such contradiction.
The contradictions nurture the possibilities of challenge and change. If the emerging contradictions are distinct from those of the earlier era, so are the terrains of conflicts. While the main battleground, particularly in the developing world, will still be at the level of the nation-state, the multilateral organisations, used and abused by global capital, are emerging as a very important arena to resist the general onslaught of global capital. A new possibility is also unfolding. The resistance to global capital is developing universally at the people's level. Notwithstanding differing assessments of the World Social Forum, its emergence points to this.
Will UNCTAD demonstrate a sense of history in the making and model its structure and activities to closely reflect the conjuncture it finds itself in today? Will it locate new terrains for the struggle for a new world order and articulate the urge for a new world of peace, equity and economic security? For a new world democratic order?
This will cast upon UNCTAD a new historic role, that of exploring and analysing the emerging contradictions and facilitating a praxis for transformation.
(The writer is a former Union Finance Secretary.)The Hindu:
